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THE MEASUREMENT OF FAIR-MINDEDNESS

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BY
GOODWIN B. WATSON, PH.D.

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CHAPTER I

THE NEED FOR TESTS OF FAIR-MINDEDNESS

Swift changes have come in educational practice since the days of not so long ago, when the efficiency of the instruction which had been meted out to the youth of the countryside was judged by the formal visit of school committee-men who were more possessed of a sense of responsibility and dignity, than of techniques for measuring achievement. Now, one who would ask regarding the efficiency of a teacher or curriculum must be prepared for a volley of I. Q.'s, E.Q.'s and A.Q.'s, with a running accompaniment of norms, standard deviations, correlations, and probable errors. If, perchance, some of the tests have been too hastily thrown together, and if some of the results have been much too hastily interpreted, that would be but natural. The measurement movement in education is not the first advance of science which some have "loved, not wisely, but too well."

Advance, it surely has been. Whatever mistakes shall have to be discovered and corrected, there will remain a large residue of gain. Future generations will be able to select curricula and methods with far greater effectiveness, because of those indefatigable workers who have discovered how to answer some questions beginning, "How much," and "How many."

Much of the dissatisfaction that has arisen in connection with this movement has expressed itself in a demand for tests of something more important than the abilities thus far measured. Some who believe that "out of the heart are the issues of life," have been searching for more accurate methods of evaluating motives, feelings, and purposes. Indeed, they may have had considerable reason for their fear that because certain qualities were easily measured, these qualities might be taken as criteria of desirable learning. It is possible that the contrary would be nearer the truth. Too often has schoolroom practice been controlled by the fact that supervisors could measure changes in ability to manipulate figures but could not measure the purposes which the child had in manipulating the figures. Hence, it has sometimes been said that the school was more concerned in teaching pupils how to write than in helping them to discriminate between forgery and an emancipation proclamation as an end for which the writing was to be

used. Most skills and techniques of the kind which has been measured are two-edged swords,—they can be used for the welfare of society or for its detriment.

A number of attempts have been made to measure something other than intelligence or practical educational skills. Among a large number of attempts, only four or five have at the present date been standardized. One is Miss Downey's Will-Temperament Test. With its many useful features, it is limited by the fact that temperament is measured in so small a realm, namely, that of expression through handwriting. A second test is the Pressey Cross-Out Test. This affords considerable aid in the discovery of persons who are emotionaly unstable. Third, we have the Woodworth Questionnaire, which sheds some light on the causal factors in emotional conditioning. A fourth test is Koh's Test of Ethical Discrimination, on which not many norms are now available. The Hart Test of Social Attitudes and Interests contains some very excellent material, but has not yet been fully standardized. The Kent-Rosanoff Association Test is also of considerable worth in discovering emotional complexes.

Among the attitudes which are considered most desirable by a considerable group of religious educators is one which is called variously, Open-Mindedness, Freedom from Prejudice, Scientific-Mindedness, and Fair-Mindedness.

Something of the sort seems to be suggested by Professor Coe's criticism[1] of religious instruction which leads not to knowledge but to partisanship, and his emphasis of fair-mindedness and teachableness as objectives in the education of modern youths.[2]

Even more clearly such a viewpoint is set forth by Hocking in *Human Nature and its Remaking*[3] when he sets up an ideal of a

[1]This kind of instruction in childhood produces not only in Catholicism but also in Protestantism an easily recognized adult type, the man who settles historical or scientific questions without historical or scientific study, and by the result judges whether his neighbors are sheep or goats. . . .

There is no security for worthy ends short of the habit of considering others' points of view.

Coe, Geo. A., *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, pp. 65, 40.

[2]An educated man . . . must have command of the method of the mind, and he must be—to some extent—a thinker, not a mere imitator. He may or may not have more opinions than other persons, but he has more opinions to which he has a right . . . .

To the extent that society is organized in the interest of the common good, and chooses its means by scientific types of analysis, the attitude of teachableness supplants that of dogmatic assertion.

Coe, Geo. A., *What Ails our Youth?* pp. 39, 77.

[3]Why do we not display with complete equableness all views of the best way of life, and say 'Now choose; think out your course for yourself'? Instead of teaching our children our morality, why not teach them ethical science? Instead of religion, metaphysical criticism? Instead of political faith, political philosophy? Instead of manners, the principles of aesthetics? In short, why not make thinkers of them rather than partisans?

Hocking, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, pp. 230–23.

rational scientifically-minded generation, free to choose its own best course.

Likewise Miss Follett in *The New State*, a well-known exposition of a new social and political philosophy, finds open-mindedness one of the central prerequisites.[4] In every disagreement she believes men should find a new challenge to investigation and rethinking, not an occasion for intellectual strife.

Frequently, in his writings, Professor John Dewey has set forth very clearly an educational objective of open-mindedness.[5] He

[4]The lesson of the new psychology is, then: Never settle down within the theory you have chosen, the cause you have embraced; know that another theory, another cause exists and seek that. The enhancement of life is not for the comfort-lover. As soon as you succeed,—real success means something arising to overthrow your security . . .

And throughout our participation in the group process we must be ever on our guard that we do not confuse differences and antagonisms, that diversity does not arouse hostility. Suppose a friend says something with which I do not agree. It may be that instantly I feel antagonistic, feel as if we were on opposite sides, and my emotions are at once tinged with some of the enmity which being on opposite sides usually brings. Our relations become slightly strained, we change the subject as soon as possible, etc. But suppose we were really civilized beings, then we should think, 'How interesting this is; this idea has evidently a larger content than I realized; if my friend and I can unify this material we shall separate with a larger idea than either of us had before!"

Follett, M. P., *The New State*, pp. 38, 40.

[5]Some attitudes may be named which are central in effective intellectual ways of dealing with subject matter. Among the most important are directness, open-mindedness, single-mindedness (or whole-heartedness) and responsibility . . .

Open-mindedness. Partiality is, as we have seen, an accompaniment of the existence of interest, since this means sharing, partaking, taking sides in some movement. All the more reason, therefore, for an attitude of mind which actively welcomes suggestions and relevant information from all sides . . . Openness of mind means accessibility of mind to any and every consideration that will throw light upon the situation that needs to be cleared up, and that will help determine the consequences of acting this way or that . . . The worst thing about stubbornness of mind, about prejudices, is that they arrest development; they shut the mind off from new stimuli. Open-mindedness means the retention of the childlike attitude; closed-mindedness means premature intellectual old age . . .

Open-mindedness is not the same as empty-mindedness. To hang out a sign saying, 'Come right in; there is no one at home' is not the equivalent of hospitality. But there is a kind of passivity, willing to let experiences accumulate and sink in and ripen, which is an essential of development, Results may be hurried; processes may not be forced. They take their own time to mature. Were all instructors to realize that the quality of mental process, not the production of correct answers, is the measure of educative growth something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked . . .

Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 204–206.

While it is not the business of education to prove every statement made, any more than to teach every possible item of information, it is its business to cultivate deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere and open-minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded, and to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves. No matter how much an individual knows as a matter of hearsay and information, if he has not habits and attitudes of this sort, he is not intellectually educated. He lacks the rudiments of mental discipline. And since these habits are not a gift of nature (no matter how strong the aptitude for acquiring them); since, moreover, the casual circumstances of the natural and social environment are not enough to compel their acquisition, the main office of education is to supply conditions that make for their cultivation. The formation of these habits is the Training of the Mind.

Dewey, John, *How We Think*, pp. 27, 28.

has pointed out the confining consequences of prejudice. Moreover he has made it clear that he is interested in a sort of open-mindedness which is not empty-mindedness, but is akin to the meaning of "fair-mindedness" as used in these tests.

One of the most popular presentations of this same idea is found in *The Mind in the Making* by James Harvey Robinson.[6] The whole thesis of this luminous book is set forth in a clear-cut demand for a "critical, open-minded attitude" as the solution for most of the world's ills.

Speaking particularly from the viewpoint of the function of higher education, President E. M. Hopkins of Dartmouth College[7] said: "It is one of the functions of the college to promote open-mindedness—a quality sorely needed today in a period of intolerance that is worse than any other in history."

It seems clear, then that any attempt to study open-mindedness will not be labor in a field which is deemed trivial and insignificant. Whatever may have been true of some aspects of educational measurement, certainly the construction of tests in this field will not be a business of testing simply for the fun of testing,—of sticking in prods to see what happens, quite regardless of the social and philosophical significance of the results, if any are attained.

There remains another important question with regard to the worth of the enterprise. Some who would grant that the field is one in which social consequences are very significant might well ask: "But why tests? Why not experimentation to see what kinds of teaching, what subject matter, and mental training tend toward open-mindedness? Why not a treatise setting forth even more clearly the dangers of prejudice in modern society and an attempt to convince men, yes, to convert them?"

In this field, as in every other, selection of desirable method waits

[6]If some magical transformation could be produced in men's ways of looking at themselves and their fellows, no inconsiderable part of the evils which now afflict society would vanish away or remedy themselves automatically. If the majority of influential persons held the opinions and occupied the point of view that a few rather uninfluential people now do, there would, for instance, be no likelihood of another great war; the whole problem of 'labor and capital' would be transformed and attenuated; national arrogance, race animosity, political corruption, and inefficiency would all be reduced below the danger point. As an old Stoic proverb has it, men are tormented by the opinions they have of things, rather than by the things themselves. This is eminently true of many of our worst problems today . . .

I am not advocating any particular method of treating human affairs, but rather such a general frame of mind, such a critical, open-minded attitude, as has hitherto been but sparsely developed among those who aspire to be men's guides, whether religious, political, economic, or academic.

Robinson, J. H., *The Mind in the Making*, pp. 3, 12.

[7]Reported by the *New York Sun*, Dec. 4, 1924.

upon the creation of measuring instruments. Schools and theorists set forth their schemes; and one may appear effective, another quite hopeless, but there is no proof of the pudding without some standard by which the eater can make his judgment.

> Richards, in his presidential address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science said: "Plato recognized, long ago, in an often-quoted epigram, that when weights and measures are left out, little remains of any art. Modern science echoes this dictum in its insistence on quantitative data; science becomes more scientific as it becomes more exactly quantitative".[8]

Before we can decide whether this course or that, whether lecturing or discussion, whether accusation or persuasion will be more effective in the creation of fair-mindedness, we must have first some method of telling in how great a degree this quality of mind is present before and after the application of these devices.

"After all," some may say, "while fair-mindedness is certainly an essential objective in the educative process, and while it is true that we must first have some method of judging as to how great a degree it is present, can we not tell by unrefined observation? Do not people know prejudiced persons from fair-minded persons? Can not people tell you themselves the points at which they are prejudiced and those at which they are open-minded?"

All of the evidence seems to indicate that such commonsense judgments are highly unreliable. Probably the best study of the reliability of ratings on traits of character has been made by Rugg.[9] After an exhaustive study under conditions unusually favorable he finds that character ratings are valid only when (1) the ratings are made by three or more independent judges, (2) who have been trained under a leader skilled in scaling so that they are in perfectly clear agreement as to the scale being used, and (3) who are thoroughly acquainted with the subjects. These conditions can very rarely be fulfilled. "A single rating by a typical school officer will only rarely locate a person within his proper 'fifth' of the entire scale." "Hence the apparently dogmatic answer to the question, 'Can human character be rated on point scales accurately enough for practical uses in education?' No! It would be far better to give our energies to the attempt to measure it objectively than to make subjective judgments on point scales. The point cannot be made too emphatic that we should discard these loose methods of rating once and for

[8]Quoted by W. A. McCall in *How to Measure in Education* p. 8.

[9]Rugg, H. O., *Journal of Educational Psychology*, Feb.-Nov. 1921.

all." It does not seem probable that we may hope for any greater reliability in ratings of fair-mindedness than he has there discovered with reference to intelligence, leadership, industry, team-work, etc. If we include self-ratings, we may well expect less validity. Dewey, in a recent lecture, said, "It is of the very nature of prejudice that it is largely unconscious. Everyone is pretty sure that the matters which seem to us to be our prejudices, aren't."

Further light in the same direction came from an investigation carried on for other purposes, described here on pages 25 and 26. One individual, who was rated by a number of the students who were in classes with him as one of the most fair-minded persons in the school, was described by an intimate friend as "perfectly hopeless" in his extremism and prejudice upon a number of religious and economic issues. "Conclusions which he has drawn by 'intuition' he is willing to die for, however incongruous they may be with the results of his rational thinking." Another person described this same individual as "one of the most lovable personalities I have ever dealt with, but quite likely to go off half-cocked on some new idea." In this case at least, there seems to be clear evidence of what Thorndike has called the "halo effect."

Again, evidence comes from a class of eighteen normal school students studying educational measurements, who were asked to rank themselves and other members of the class on open-mindedness. They did it under protest, saying they did not trust their ratings, but they did try to do it conscientiously. The ratings which a pupil gave himself yield a correlation of .07 with the average ratings which he was given by the other members of the class. Fifteen of the eighteen pupils were given ranks which ranged from 3 to 17, or further.

A little more evidence is found in the vote of students and faculty members of two institutions with regard to the two most open-minded members of their group. While there was considerable agreement upon a few individuals, the remainder of the votes scattered to include 73 per cent. as many individuals as there were persons voting and an average of 51 per cent. of the possible choices in each group.

While all of this evidence may not be conclusive and there is need for further study of the conditions under which ratings in this field will be reliable, this evidence does make it clear that in general such ratings are not dependable or trustworthy. If they are to

be proven useful at all, the proof itself will require a test, the validity and reliability of which have already been established.

In general, there seems to be clear evidence that there is a need and demand for a type of education which shall bring about progress toward fair-mindedness. Such progress is at best, uncertain, until some instrument can be constructed which will measure the degree to which fair-mindedness, or freedom from bias, has been achieved.

The construction of such a test, however, is not wholly in the interests of those who wish to promote fair-mindedness as an educational objective. While the author finds himself in very great sympathy with this point of view, the test itself is an equally good instrument for those who believe fair-mindedness undesirable upon certain questions. There is no attempt here to insist that fair-mindedness rather than prejudice is desirable. Many competent persons feel that upon certain questions the reverse is true. From either point of view the test should prove useful. It merely indicates what the situation is within the individual at the time at which the test is administered. In the light of this evidence, the educator can more discriminatingly select methods which will lead in the direction in which he deems it desirable to work.

In order to make the problem compassable, the issues with which this test deals have been limited to religious and economic issues, including in the former certain "moral," or "amusement" questions which have become tied up with religious sanctions. The choice of these two types of issue as the field in which to work was determined in part by the author's interest, but in large degree by a realization of the tremendous consequences of prejudice and intolerance, as contrasted with fair-open-scientific-mindedness in these realms.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TESTS

In the endeavor to construct tests which shall objectively measure fair-mindedness, there are two obvious dangers. One is that the test shall be a measure of agreement with the opinions of the person who constructs the test. It is all too easy to feel that those who differ radically from our own point of view are thereby showing strong prejudice. A second danger is that the test shall prove to be merely a measure of convictions, a test of opinions reasonably arrived at and held with a fair degree of confidence.

To avoid these dangers, these tests were constructed to measure prejudice defined as: Any tendencies, however produced, (*a*) to cross out, as distasteful, terms which represent one side or another of religious or economic controversies; (*b*) to call sincere and competent persons who hold different opinions on religious and economic issues incompetent or insincere; (*c*) to draw from given evidence conclusions which support one's bias but which are not justified by that evidence; (*d*) to condemn in a group which is disliked, activities which would be condoned or approved in some other group; (*e*) to regard arguments, some of which are really strong and others of which are really weak, as all strong if they be in accord with the subject's bias, or all weak if they run counter to that bias; and (*f*) to attribute to all the people or objects in a group, characteristics which belong to only a portion of that group. Most of the tests were so constructed that opinions could be expressed on either side of the issue without going to the extreme of registering one of the tendencies which have been defined as prejudices. All of the tests were so constructed that prejudice or lack of fair-mindedness could be registered upon several aspects of each of the religious and economic issues considered. One might be prejudiced, for example, in the direction of fundamentalism, or of modernism, or of radicalism upon religious questions.

Form A, the Word Cross Out Test, is based upon the principle employed by Pressey, that a tendency to cross out an unusually large number of words, feeling that they are annoying or distasteful, is an indication of some sort of emotional set, or conditioning. The following are typical of the fifty-one words included in this test:

Bolshevist	Dancing
Mystic	Holy Communion
Sunday Blue Laws	Unitarian

Form B, the Degree of Truth Test, consists of a collection of statements about religious and economic matters, upon each of which it would be possible to find sincere and competent authorities in disagreement. The following are typical of the fifty-three statements included in this test:

The churches are more sympathetic with capital than with labor.
Jesus was more interested in social, than in individual salvation.
Poor men cannot get justice in the courts today.
The ordinary Catholic priest is well above the average in his community, so far as learning and good judgment are concerned.
Prohibition, in the experience of the United States, has been a failure.

In each case, the subject is given the opportunity, by checking on a scale, to say that each statement is:

(2)—so true that no one with a fair understanding of the subject could sincerely and honestly believe it false.
(1)—probably true, or true in large degree.
(0)—uncertain, or doubtful.
(−1)—probably false, or false in large degree.
(−2)—so false that no one with a fair understanding of the subject could sincerely and honestly believe it true.

The emphatic portions of the first and last positions are underlined in the directions, so that people will be more certain to notice the extreme character of the statement. Both this test and the Form A test force many thoughtful individuals into a dilemma, neither horn of which is wholly satisfactory. For some reasons they wish to cross a given word out, for other reasons they would prefer not to. They cannot compromise here. Likewise in the Form B test, they dislike to admit that the statement is only probably true or false but they hesitate to go the full length of the extreme position. The theory of the test is that in such an uncomfortable situation, the choice is more than ordinarily significant.

Form C, the Inference Test, presents a statement of fact, followed by several conclusions which some persons might draw from that fact. Thus, for example, it is stated:

1. Statistics show that in the United States, of one hundred men starting out at an age of 25, at the end of forty years, one will be wealthy, while fifty-four will be dependent upon relatives or charity for support.

☐ The present social order cheats the many for the benefit of the few.

☐ The average young man, under present conditions, cannot count on being wealthy at the age of 65.

☐ Most men are shiftless, lazy, or extravagant, otherwise they would not need to be dependent.

☐ The one man is living upon luxuries ground out of the bones of the masses of common people.

☐ Some day the workers will rise in revolt.

☐ No such conclusion can fairly be drawn.

The subjects are asked to check only such conclusions as are established by the facts given in the statement above, drawing upon no other evidence. They are warned to check only those inferences which are certain,—none that are merely probable. It is permissible to check either the final alternative under each case, stating that none of the conclusions can fairly be drawn, or else that one in each case (the second, in this example) which is merely an innocuous repetition of the evidence given in the preliminary statement.

Form D, the Moral Judgments Test, consists of fifteen instances, with an opportunity beneath each, to approve the act, to declare it a matter of indifference, or to disapprove of it. Each instance in the test is parallel to one or two other instances in the type of situation it presents. Thus, "faith cures" are presented, once through the medium of a Japanese idol, once at a Roman Catholic shrine, and once under the leadership of a Protestant evangelist. In another instance unwarranted search is made of a suspected "radical" headquarters, while in another, the same procedure is carried out with a big business corporation, suspected of dishonesty. These instances are, of course, scattered through the test so as to conceal as far as possible the parallelism. It matters not, for the purposes of the test, whether the subject shall approve, be indifferent to, or disapprove, the action in any situation, if only he will be consistent in the parallel act under slightly different circumstances.

Form E, the Arguments Test, is based upon the tendency of an individual to feel that all of the arguments upon his side of the case are strong, while those on the opposite side are weak, irrelevant, or very easily refuted. Twelve issues, such as the desirability of the Roman Catholic church, the probability of immortality, the usefulness of the Ku Klux Klan, etc., were selected. Upon each were gathered the principal arguments used by persons supporting

each side of the question. Some were presumed to be weak, while others seemed to the author to be strong. After selection by a few seminar groups, the arguments were submitted to a group of twelve judges, chosen because of their supposed ability to rate religious and economic arguments fairly. They included a professor of philosophy, a professor of education, a professor of economics, a professor of sociology, two professors of public speaking and argumentation, two teachers of religious education in different institutions, one leader in inter-denominational activities in the industrial field, a member of the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A. and a psychologist. Extraordinary difficulty was found in getting any unanimity. Arguments had to be revised, and resubmitted. Apparently, wide deviations in judgment occurred, less because of bias on the question as a whole, than because of unusual reactions to some feature of the premise in the argument. For example, certain judges were not greatly concerned by the fact that the particular argument favored the child labor law, but did seem to be influenced by the fact that the premise contained the word *profit*, or *employer* or *farmer*.

No argument was finally retained in the test upon which there were less than 75 per cent. of the judges in agreement. As further evidence, twelve of the most fair-minded persons, as recorded by the other forms of the test, were studied to see how well their opinions agreed with the judges. The results are tabulated in Table III of the Appendix. It is not at all improbable that many capable students of each issue will look over the ratings given to arguments by other sane and capable individuals, and find themselves dismayed. Few, if any, individuals have been discovered who do not differ emphatically from the great mass of their fellow students, on some of these arguments.

Form F, the Generalization Test, contains a number of generalizations about Jews, ministers, I. W. W.'s, business men, miracles, missionaries, etc. Each of these generalizations is true of some of the members of the group, but not of all of the members. The subject is given a chance to say that the statements are true of "All, Most, Many, Few, or No" members of the group. Any answer except "All" or "No" is accepted, and ignored in the scoring.

Each of these test-forms has been revised six, seven, or, in some instances, ten times. Preposterous as some of them may seem, no items were retained which were not reacted to in the extreme prej-

udice form, by several individuals among the first two hundred to take the test.

At the close of the six test-forms is appended a personal data sheet, asking for sex, age, occupation, education, religious training, occupation of father, and years of residence in communities of less than 5,000 people, and more than 100,000 people. The tests may be anonymous, or the name of the subject may be signed. Usually a *key*, in which the subject can recognize and recover his own paper is desirable.

A brief Manual of Directions is published separately, giving the purpose of the tests, the results of standardization, directions for giving the tests, and for obtaining the gross score. This Manual of Directions, together with complete copies of the test and full directions for finding both the gross score and the analytical score, may be obtained from the Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.

CHAPTER III

THE SCORING OF THE TESTS

Two methods for scoring the tests have been developed. First, the tests may be scored to find the general level of prejudice within the individual or group. In determining this "gross score" the examiner is not concerned with the direction which particular prejudices take, nor with the strength of economic as compared to religious prejudices, etc. The second method of scoring, while more expensive and complicated is more rewarding. The "analytical score" thus obtained, indicates the extent to which the prejudices of the subject are in agreement with the special interests of capitalists, or of economic liberals, or of economic radicals, or of fundamentalists, or of Roman Catholics, etc. Twelve types of bias are used as the basis of classification.

The Gross Score may be objectively determined in accord with the specific directions given in the manual. In brief, the scoring method is:

Form A: One point for each word crossed out.
Form B: Three points for each extreme statement.
Form C: Four points for each unjustified conclusion.
Form D: Three points for being indifferent to an act in one case, while approving or disapproving the parallel act; five points for approving in one case and condemning in the other.
Form E: Four points for any question upon which all the arguments on one side of a question have been rated either strong or weak, while all, or all but one, of the arguments on the opposite side have been given the reverse rating.
Form F: Three points for making the "All" or "No" generalization about any case.

This yields a total of 489 possible points. The score, whether for a single form, or for the test as a whole should be expressed in terms of the *per cent.* of the total possible opportunities to show prejudice, to which the subject has reacted. Thus, a very fair-minded person may score only 49 points all told, a gross score of ten per cent. A very prejudiced person may take sixty or seventy per cent. of the chances to manifest a prejudice.

It will be noticed that in obtaining the gross score the tests have been weighted as follows: Each error in Test A has been penalized

one point, each error in Test B three points, in Test C four points, in Test D three or five points, depending upon the amount of inconsistency; in Test E four points, and in Test F three points. These weightings were arbitrarily assigned in accord with the opinions of two groups of graduate students who took the tests, suggested revisions, and analyzed their own reactions. The principal result of this weighting has been to decrease the influence of Test A in the composite of tests. Thus, it requires the checking of three words on Test A to contribute as much to the total score as the circling of one extreme statement in Test B or Test F.

The resultant score, however, is not greatly changed by this method of weighting. If each prejudice reaction in each test be given only one point, and if the per cent. on each test be computed and the results averaged, then neither the point weighting nor the length of the test influences directly the result. The influence of each form will be determined only by its standard deviation. The standard deviations for the gross scores on each of the six test forms are given in Table IV in the Appendix.

The correlation between the gross scores yielded by this method of weighting with the scores yielded by the weighting used regularly in the tests is $.91 \pm .006$.

The Analytical Score. The second purpose for which the tests may be scored is to answer the question: "Along what particular religious or economic lines is this individual prejudiced, and how strong is the prejudice in each of the outstanding lines?" For this purpose each test element has been classified as "The sort of response which a typical capitalist might make," or "the sort of response which a typical Roman Catholic would probably make," or "the sort of response which some other religious or economic type might make." This, it will be noted, does not say that every person who makes that response *is* necessarily a capitalist or a Roman Catholic or a religious radical or some other type. It says, merely, that to the extent of that reaction the subject is *in agreement with* the typical capitalist or Roman Catholic, etc. Thus, for example, one's reason for crossing out "Ku Klux Klan" in Test A may be something very different from a prejudice in the direction of Roman Catholicism, but to the extent of that reaction the individual is in agreement with the typical Roman Catholic.

If the test is used to study the prejudices in any individual or group with reference to direction as well as amount, then a copy

of the Analytical Score Sheet[1] will be needed for each individual taking the test.

The Analytical Score will tell to what extent the prejudices manifested by the subject are in agreement with each of the following points of view:

1. Economic radicals.
2. Economic liberals.
3. Economic capitalists.
4. Persons fighting for a "social gospel," rather than an individual interpretation.
5. Persons interested mainly in a "personal gospel," prayer, mysticism, communion, salvation, etc.
6. Fundamentalists, orthodox "Apostles' Creed" variety.
7. Modernists, holding liberal Christian views.
8. Religious radicals, very broad, displeased with most existing Christian manifestations of religion.
9. Protestants who are inclined not to like Catholics.
10. Catholics who are inclined not to like Protestants.
11. Persons with high, strict standards of sex-ethics, or amusement, or "bad habits," or similar moral matters.
12. Persons with broad loose standards of sex-ethics, or amusement, or "bad habits" or similar moral matters.

In all of the forms of the tests which were used in obtaining the results here published, eighteen typical lines of bias were used. Later, it was discovered that the last six somewhat duplicated the classification made in the first twelve and to save the extra scoring labor the following six were omitted:

13. Bias against economic capitalism and the status quo in business.
14. Bias against economic radicals.
15. Bias against orthodox Apostles' Creed fundamentalists.
16. Bias against liberals and radicals in religious matters.
17. Bias against anything that seems unscientific, mysterious, superstitious or magical.
18. Bias against every religion and everything having to do with religion.

A convenient method of representing the analytical score for an individual is the *prejudice profile.* (See pages 46 to 62 in the Appendix). The per cent. of opportunities that agree with an economic radical which was taken by each individual is represented by the distance from left to right between the base line (zero per cent.) and the vertical profile line. So, likewise, the per cent. of prejudice

[1]Obtainable at Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City.

in agreement with an economic liberal, a capitalist, a supporter of the social gospel, etc., is represented in each case by the distance between the base line and the profile. Obviously, the outstanding lines of prejudice are represented by the columns which protrude farthest to the right.

It may seem confusing that almost every individual should register some prejudice along each of these lines and that many individuals seem to agree with contrasting points of view. This is due to the fact that the analytical scoring and the prejudice profile do not necessarily show the reason for any prejudice but only the extent to which that prejudice is in agreement with some types of individuals. Almost everyone has some points at which he is in agreement with his worst enemies. A rabid fundamentalist, for example, may be bitterly prejudiced against Catholics, but at the same time he may share with them a prejudice in favor of the Virgin Birth. In general, however, a person who shows a considerable amount of agreement with each of the contrasting points of view seems to be the type of individual whose reactions are not clear-cut, but who is prejudiced now against this and now against that, according as he may have heard the view advocated by a person with an unpleasant appearance or seen it referred to in a denunciatory fashion in some newspaper.

Grievous errors in the interpretations of the profiles will occur unless it is kept clearly in mind that the analytical score and the prejudice profile do not pretend to register the reasons underlying prejudice manifestation. This is particularly true in the case of small per cents. of prejudice. A low per cent. of prejudice with which a typical capitalist would agree may be due to very great fair-mindedness on the part of the subject, or may be due to a strong prejudice against capitalists or capitalism. Only the outstanding lines of prejudice, those which, on the profile, extend out markedly to the right, beyond the general run of the analytical scores, are to be considered clearly significant. An individual who takes forty or fifty per cent. of the opportunities to agree in prejudices with a typical Roman Catholic but who takes only fifteen or twenty per cent. of the opportunities to agree in prejudices with the other types represented in this scoring, is very likely, indeed, to be prejudiced in favor of Roman Catholicism. Strong evidence for validity exists only for the three or four largest and most marked elements in the analytical score of each person and group.

An important variation of the prejudice profile is its use to show group characteristics. If a number of individuals in some group be tested, their analytical scores be computed, and the average score along each of the lines of bias be found, then this series of averages may be graphed, giving a prejudice profile for the group. Similarly, two or more groups may be compared and their outstanding differences in prejudice graphically recorded by superimposing one group profile upon the other. (See pages 69 to 84 in the Appendix).

CHAPTER IV

WHAT DO THE TESTS REALLY MEASURE?

Reliability. A necessary preliminary question is: Do the tests measure any single attribute, or are they a heterogeneous collection of reactions in which a person might respond one way at one time and a different way at another time? The answer to this question must be stated in terms of reliability,—that is to say, in terms of the correlation between the score made by a person on taking the test at one time and the score which he would make if he were to take it again under exactly the same circumstances, practice effect being eliminated.

The reliability of the general level of prejudice indicated by the gross score was computed by finding the score which would be obtained by half the test (Items 1, 3, 5, 7, etc.), and the correlation of that score with the score obtained by using the other half of the tests (Items 2, 4, 6, 8, etc.). Thirty papers, selected to give a normal distribution, yielded a self-correlation of .92 ± .02. For 61 papers the self-correlation was .89 ± .015. For 70 additional papers the self-correlation was .96 ± .001. These correlations indicate the relationship to be expected between one-half of the test and the other half of the test. Applying the Spearman-Brown Prophecy Formula we find that it is to be expected that the correlation between one administration of the test and another administration under the same circumstances might reasonably be expected to be .96.

Occasionally, as in the studies at Lake Geneva (see page 37) Forms A, B, and C are given at one time and Forms D, E, and F at another time. The correlation between one-half of each of these tests with the other half of the same tests has been computed for 189 papers to be .82 for Tests A, B, and C and .68 for Tests D, E, and F. Again, using the Spearman-Brown Prophecy Formula, the self-correlation for Forms A, B, and C is found to be .90; that for Forms D, E, and F is found to be .81.

Sometimes, in order to obtain very rapidly a notion of the general prejudice status of a group a single form may be used. The self-correlation for the general gross score indicated by each of the forms is indicated in Table V in the Appendix.

The next question is: How reliable are the various lines of bias indicated in the diagnostic score? The reactions along each of the twelve (previously eighteen) lines of bias may be studied just as though each one were a test in itself. Reactions 1, 3, 5, 7, etc., may be correlated with reactions 2, 4, 6, 8, etc. The results of this study are indicated in Table VI in the Appendix.

Other things being equal, a large number of items will yield a higher reliability than will a small number of items. In order to discover how far the differences in reliability indicated in Table VI are due merely to the fact that there are more items in one direction of bias than there are in some other direction of bias, the last column on the right has been corrected by the Prophecy Formula to a statement in terms of the probable self-*r* for 200 such points. Within the 12 lines of bias now used for diagnosis there is a variation of from .60 to .88,—not a very significant difference.

Validity. Evidently the tests afford a consistent measure of something, or, at least, a measure which is as consistent as that afforded by many tests upon which educators place some reliance. The crucial question is: What is that something—is it really fair-mindedness? Six lines of study have been carried on to answer this question:

First, the tests themselves are examined with reference to what they seem to be measuring.

Second, the correlations between each form of the test and the test as a whole are obtained.

Third, a study is made of the scores obtained by individuals who are selected by their group as most fair-minded.

Fourth, individuals who are supposed, by those who know them well, to have pronounced lines of prejudice, are given the test, and their reactions compared with those which would be anticipated. This same study includes the analysis of their own scores made by a number of individuals who are accustomed to testing methods and to a reasonable objectivity of mind.

Fifth, certain groups who might be supposed to possess certain lines of prejudice are studied by the test and the results compared with the assumptions of competent judges as to the lines of prejudice which might be expected to exist within the given groups.

Sixth, an examination is made of the extent to which the tests may be a measure of intelligence or of opinion rather than of prejudice.

1. From the standpoint of their construction and their scoring what do the tests seem to measure? Consider first Form A, the Word Cross-Out Test. This is based upon a principle which has been well standardized by Pressey and other students of controlled association, who state that any tendency to cross out, as disagreeable or annoying, a considerable number of words of one type or meaning, is an indication of some emotional instability with reference to that field. Of course, it must be freely admitted that on its face value the crossing out of a word or of even two or three similar words is not necessarily correlative with a lack of fair-mindedness in connection with the subject represented by the words. It might however be supposed that it would be more difficult for a person to deal fairly with subjects which he found distasteful and annoying. Some persons found introspectively that this test-form revealed prejudices of which they had not previously been conscious. (See Profile No. 26, Appendix). Also, it was found to be the fair-minded, discriminating individuals who were most annoyed by the test. They could not decide in any case what to do. For certain reasons, they wished to cross the word out. For certain other reasons, they wished to leave it unchecked. The usual result was that a small number was crossed out. On the other hand, many persons found it no problem. They checked word after word with decided emphasis. One Y. M. C. A. leader, noted for his strong prejudices, exclaimed after crossing out two-thirds of the words, "That's the most annoying list of words I ever saw in my life!"

Form B, the Degree of Truth Test, registers the tendency of an individual to hold such extreme views on doubtful issues that he is willing to call those who differ from him incompetent or insincere. If a subject believes any one of the statements in the test to be true he is forced into the position of classifying it as "probably true," or else, "so true that no one with a fair understanding of the subject could sincerely and honestly believe it false." The tendency of a prejudice to manifest itself in this fashion was recognized by Locke in his statement:

> That which is inconsistent with our principles is so far from passing for probable with us that it will not be allowed possible. The reference borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all other, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch anything contrary *to these established rules*..... There is nothing more ordinary than children receiving into their minds propositions....from their parents, nurses, or those about them, which

being insinuated into their unwary as well as unbiased understandings and fastened by degrees, are at last (and this whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched or questioned.[1]

Trotter in his *Instincts of the Herd* describes vividly the kind of prejudice which is likely to manifest itself in the Form B Test.

When, therefore, we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about the basis of which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad form, or wicked, we may know that that opinion is a non-rational one, and probably, therefore, founded upon inadequate evidence.[2]

There is further evidence that outstanding progress in science and in philosophy has waited upon the individual who is willing to admit that there may be truth in points of view not commonly held in his environment and that the judgment of others is worthy of respect, whether they agree with his own conclusions or not.

Form C, the Inference Test, illustrates in miniature the practice of the soap-box orator who reels off a list of facts and statistics and proceeds to draw from them conclusions which support his point of view but which have only a very flimsy connection with the evidence he has offered. Persons who have supposed that human beings, when presented with the "facts in the case," would be led by those facts to a rational and united conclusion have been abruptly disillusioned if they have made any attempt to verify this with groups of varied background and opinion. Students of the thinking process have long been familiar with this tendency. Dewey summarized the conclusions of many in the following statements:

What a person has not only daily and hourly, but momentary need of performing, is not a technical and abstruse matter; nor, on the other hand, is it trivial and negligible. Such a function must be congenial to the mind, and must be performed, in an unspoiled mind, upon every fitting occasion. Just because, however, it is an operation of drawing inferences, of basing conclusions upon evidence, of reaching belief *indirectly*, it is an operation that may go wrong as well as right, and hence is one that needs safeguarding and training. The greater its importance, the greater are the evils when it is ill-exercised.

[1]Quoted by Dewey, John, *How We Think*, p. 24.
[2]Trotter, W., *Instincts of the Herd*, p. 44.

> Conclusions may be generated by a modicum of fact merely because the suggestions are vivid and interesting; a large accumulation of data may fail to suggest a proper conclusion because existing customs are adverse to entertaining it.
>
> Secondly, next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mold and fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis. Such men, Locke goes on to say, while not denying the existence of facts and evidence, can not be convinced by the evidence that would decide them if their minds were not so closed by adherence to fixed belief.[3]

In Form D, the Moral Judgment Test, one of the most easily recognized manifestations of prejudice is recorded. If an individual condemns the socialists for passing out leaflets through the neighborhood and then whole-heartedly volunteers to assist his church in leaving a leaflet in front of every door in the neighborhood, it does not seem too much to say that he is lacking in fair-mindedness on that issue. So, likewise, with the man who approves a raid of radical headquarters but is quite indignant at the thought of raiding a corporation on a suspicion that its financial transactions have been shady, it would be commonly assumed that he possessed a degree of prejudice on that issue. This test seems to offer almost *prima facie* evidence of its validity.

Form E, the Arguments Test, registers the tendency familiar to every propagandist and debator to feel that the arguments on his side of the case are strong and convincing and that those of the opponents, to each of which he feels he possesses a perfectly adequate answer, are quite trivial, irrelevant, or hardly worth considering. Again, Locke's insight led him to recognize this hindrance to philosophical thought:

> This kind is of those who put passion in the place of reason, and being resolved that that shall govern their actions and arguments, neither use their own, nor hearken to other people's reason, any farther, than it suits their humor, interest, or party.

Jevons points out that

> It is exceedingly rare to find persons who can with perfect fairness estimate and register facts for or against their own particular views and theories.[4]

While with children this tendency is present in a very obvious and näive form, with adults many things besides the conclusion

[3]Dewey, John, *How We Think*, pp. 18–19.
[4]Jevons, Wm. S., *Principles of Science*, Vol. II, p. 5.

to which the argument leads tend to influence their decisions. This was illustrated by the difficulty experienced in finding arguments so obviously strong or obviously weak that fair-minded persons would recognize that strength or weakness. (See page 11.)

Therefore, only a coarse grading is used upon this question and a variation from the opinions of the judges is not regarded as evidence of prejudices until it affects so many arguments that *all* on one side are regarded as strong or as weak; and all on the opposite side, or all but one of those on the opposite side, are given a contrasting rating.

Form F, the Generalization Test, rests upon what may be termed the "one-swallow-makes-a-summer" fallacy. This test registers the tendency in individuals to say that all Jews would cheat, that no church members are violating the Volstead Act, that all Roman Catholics are superstitious or that none of them are, and so on,—attributing to all the members of a group characteristics which are true of only a part of the group. It has been rather clearly demonstrated by the testimony of a number of individuals that they acquired some of their race-prejudice in a single instance, or two, and afterwards reacted to all members of the race in terms of the conditioning of the single experience. (See the modification of this test for use in measuring fair-mindedness on race-relations, page 41.)

In general, then, it is evident that these tests may be validated in the way in which examinations in school subjects always used to be validated and in the way in which many tests are now validated. Why is this an arithmetic test? Because it contains arithmetic problems and people who can do this sort of trick would naturally be good in arithmetic! Why is this a geography test? Because on their face the questions deal with geography! Why is this a spelling test? Because the reactions registered are in terms of ability to spell! It is only reasonable to expect that any persons, for whom arithmetic and geography and spelling tests are validated because of the material they contain, will regard these tests of fair-mindedness as sufficiently validated by the evidence offered above. The fact, however, that such evidence is often misleading requires that a thorough demonstration of validity shall proceed further.

2. It is quite possible that some persons will feel fairly well convinced that the majority of the tests give indications of prej-

udice as contrasted with fair-mindedness, but feel skeptical about one of the forms. Form A is particularly subject to this criticism. The answer to all such objections must be in terms of correlation, whatever the test may appear on the surface to demonstrate. If one of the tests really does measure the same thing which the rest of the forms measure, then it is as valid as they are, even though it appears to common sense to be a record of opinions, of reading ability, or of stolidity. In Table VII in the Appendix are given the data for correlation between the gross scores obtained by using the whole test and those which would be obtained by each of the forms. These data are given first for forty papers and then for one hundred nineteen additional papers. In the raw form they range from .45 to .86. Corrected for attenuation so as to indicate the true correlation between the reaction indicated by one form of the test and the reaction indicated by the total, the correlations range from .53 to .94.

Of course, in these correlations each test form is included in the total with which the separate form is correlated. If the correlation be made between one test-form and the average score on the other five forms, then the resulting correlations range from .11 to .42. (See Table VIII in the Appendix).

Since these tests really measure manifestations quite different in form, of a quality of prejudice or fair-mindedness which has popularly been assumed to be a more or less homogeneous unity, it is probably fair to compare these intercorrelations with those existing between the various manifestations of arithmetical ability or reading ability, or intelligence. McCall[5] finds a correlation between addition and general arithmetical ability of .12 in one class and .34 in another group. The same study shows an uncorrected correlation between reading ability and visual vocabulary, of .15 in one case, .40 in another, .45 in another, and .60 in a fourth. Steacy in "Inter-Relations of Mental Abilities" finds a correlation between various manifestations of arithmetical ability with other manifestations varying from .16 to .42, or, when corrected for attenuation, from .36 to .94, the last correlation existing between ability to subtract and ability to divide. A study by Burt on "The Distribution and Relation of Educational Abilities" published by the London County Council indicates a correlation between knowledge of arithmetical rules and ability to do problems of .76; a

[5]McCall, W. A., *The Correlation of Some Psychological and Educational Measurements*, 1916.

correlation between speed of reading and comprehension of reading of .69; and a correlation between speed of writing and quality of writing of .30. The author studied a group of 30 of the same students who were studied by the tests of fair-mindedness, using the Thorndike-McCall Reading Scale. He found a correlation between speed of reading and comprehension of reading of .21. Probably the most comparable test is the Pintner Non-Language Test for Intelligence in which the correlation between each test and the composite was studied by Dorothy R. Morgenthau.[6] She found the correlation between individual tests and the composite score to vary from .40 to .76.

It seems fair, therefore, to conclude that each form of this test is as closely related to the purpose of the test as a whole, as are the various items in an intelligence test to the score of the test as a whole; and that the forms are more closely related in these tests of fair-mindedness than is commonly the case in testing various forms of arithmetical ability, reading ability, writing ability, and the like.

Sometimes it may be desirable to use one form of the test as a substitute for the test as a whole, and to obtain with this an analyzed score. In such cases it is useful to know how well each form of the test correlates with the test as a whole, in the diagnosis which it offers. This relationship was studied in two ways. First, on each of 119 cases, the diagnosis given by each form of the test was correlated with the diagnosis given by the test as a whole. The resulting 714 correlations were worked out by the *Rho* method, and transmuted into terms of Pearson's *r*. The average correlations of the analytical score on one form of the test, and the analytical score given by the complete battery, range from .48 to .61 as indicated in Table IX in the Appendix. Second, the correlation between the per cent. score on each of the analyzed lines of prejudice as indicated by one form, and the corresponding score yielded by the complete test was computed for 40 papers, covering 415 diagnostic lines for each form. These results which range from .42 to .86 were worked out in the regular product-moment fashion, and are listed in the second column of Table IX in the Appendix.

3. A further step in validation consisted in obtaining a consensus of judgment upon the most fair-minded individuals in certain groups, and discovering the test reaction of these selected individuals.

[6]Morgenthau, Dorothy R., *Archives of Psychology*, No. 52, p. 33.

In two graduate schools the faculty were asked to select, by secret ballot, the most fair-minded members of their group. In one small graduate school the student body was asked to select by secret ballot, the most fair-minded members in the student body and also in the faculty. In each case it was made clear that fair-mindedness with respect to religious and economic issues was to be the criterion of selection.

It was evident from the lack of agreement in the vote that there are very wide variations in the reputations of rather closely associated individuals with regard to their respective qualities of fair-mindedness. However, it was assumed that a valid test should show some significant difference between the two or three most frequently mentioned in the vote of each group, and the ordinary student in the school. All of the individuals ranking among the first three in their group were invited to take the test. Copies were received from seven individuals, indicated by a star in the summation of the votes, in Table X in the Appendix.

If we consider the gross score, we find that while the average Methodist minister in a certain mid-western state registered 37 per cent. of the chances to show prejudice, and while the average college student or normal school student registered 30 per cent., this group of selected individuals averaged only 13 per cent. The differences between these people selected for fair-mindedness and the average theological student in Union Theological Seminary, is indicated on the group profiles shown on page 82 of the Appendix.

4. Some of the most significant material for validation is in the form of case studies. In twenty-four cases a description of the prejudices which might be expected in some individual was secured in advance from some relative or close friend. Then the individual was given the test, and the analytical score graphed in a prejudice profile. In thirty-one other cases, the subject was given his profile, after taking the test, and asked to make his comments upon it. The descriptions, whether given by friends before the subject took the test, or given by the subject himself afterwards, were then studied with reference to their agreement with the profile. While all fifty-five of the profiles with the parallel descriptions are on file with the original manuscript in Teachers College Library, Columbia University, New York City, only a few representative samples have been included in this study. Profiles Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11 and 12 in the Appendix, are typical of the first type, in which com-

ment was made by some friend of the subject, while Profiles Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 45, 46 and 55 in the Appendix record the reactions of the subject himself.

Several factors tended to make the comments agree less closely with the profiles than they might have been led to agree. Thus, in the studies of the first type no leading questions were asked. The *types* under which classification would be made were unknown to the person making the comments. The descriptions represent a reaction to the general question, "What religious and economic prejudices would you expect to find in . . .?" In the self-reactions, two troublesome factors entered. One was a misunderstanding of the phrase "prejudice which is in agreement with." Several people found it difficult to believe that they could have some prejudices with which a capitalist would agree and others with which an economic radical would agree. A second factor was a tendency to criticize some form or element in the test, to defend original reactions, etc., instead of facing the question as to whether or not the results were a fair description. It was not made clear to these people that the scoring system passed by about four-fifths of the reactions they had made on the test and took account only of the extreme reactions. They naturally tended to think in terms of the marks they had made on the test paper, most of which were, indeed, *opinions*, as contrasted with *prejudices*. Also, they were probably not free from the almost universal tendency to distinguish between "my convictions" and "your prejudices."

Case studies like these do not lend themselves easily to summaries, but an attempt has been made in Tables XI and XII in the Appendix to classify each response in terms of agreement with the test result. The first twenty-four statements made by people about their friends, seemed to present fifty-nine definite expectations which could be checked against the analytical score. Of these, forty-three could be classed as "Clearly Fulfilled," ten as "Doubtful," or "Possible," and six as "Not Indicated." It is probably significant that five of these last six were predictions which had been made by one individual. While such a summary is less valuable than a study of the particular cases, it is probably fair to conclude that approximately three-fourths of the unguided and general predictions made by relatives and friends seemed to be verified by the test results.

The second group of profiles has been even more difficult to summarize because so much blanket approval was indicated. What

does it mean when a person says, "I think the test shows my prejudices very well?" In this summary it has been assumed that such statements represent a real reaction to half of the eighteen analyzed scores shown on the profile. Thus, if a man condemned the whole test as unfair, he is recorded as having rejected nine predictions, and accepted none. If he approved in general, but objected at two points, he is recorded as having approved seven of the scores and rejected two. On that basis, which is obviously not unduly favorable to the test since most of the blanket reactions were positive, there were reactions to 272 analyzed scores. Of these, 220 were approved and accepted, 52 were questioned or rejected. Again, insisting that the summary is less valuable than are the particulars out of which it has been approximated, individuals confronted with their own specific scores seem to approve in about four-fifths of the cases.

5. Studies of individual cases have a distinct disadvantage to the world at large, in that the individual is not known. If the ordinary individual sees his own prediction about a friend clearly revealed by a test profile, the test having been administered and scored by someone who had never seen nor heard of the subject, he is likely to be deeply impressed. Certainly, his impression is much deeper than that he possesses upon hearing of the results in the case of a score of persons, none of whom he knows. Perhaps if it were feasible in a land of liberty, to broadcast the prejudices of well-known religious or political leaders the study of individuals could be made fairly conclusive validating evidence. However, at present it must remain far more convincing to the writer and to the people who participated in the study, than it is likely to appear to others.

This disadvantage can be partially overcome by a study of people in groups. The prejudices of a certain student in Union Theological Seminary are known to very few people. The prejudices of Union Theological Seminary students in general are fairly familiar to a large number of people. There are many people who possess what they believe to be a competent opinion about the differences in prejudice between Roman Catholic students and Protestant students in general.

Study was therefore made of certain available groups. It would be expected that valid tests would show the kinds of prejudice within each group, and the differences in prejudice between one group and

another, corresponding to the judgment of competent judges. The group profiles, shown on pages 68 to 81 of the Appendix indicate graphically the average prejudice status of each group and the comparisons between certain groups. It is useful to note not only the differences between groups which stand out so vividly on these graphs, but also the outstanding characteristics of each group. Note, for instance, the prejudice of Methodist ministers for strict amusement standards, and that of students in Union Theological Seminary for liberal economic reforms.

Attempt to check the findings of the test against the experience of competent observers was made informally at first. Groups of graduate students in three different seminars were asked to announce the places at which they would expect to find a difference in prejudice between certain groups, for example, between Methodist ministers and normal school students. Approximately twenty different predictions were made about some of the group comparisons, involving at least fifty different judges, and without exception the tests revealed the outstanding differences which these groups of students anticipated. Still there remained the probability that these students did not represent very wide-spread experience and judgment and that they did not give more than passing consideration to the question. Therefore, a further and more definite check was made by sending questionnaires to twenty-five persons, engaged in several types of occupation, living in various sections of the country, but persons who were likely to be familiar with at least some of the groups to be compared. These judges were asked to check the lines of bias (corresponding to those used in the analytical score) along which they would expect to find one group markedly more prejudiced than the other. They were asked to put two plus signs at points at which they felt particularly certain that a large difference in bias existed.

Fifteen judges replied, but, due to an ambiguity between "prejudice for" and "prejudice against," only thirteen of the replies were capable of clear interpretation. On the page facing each group profile (pages 68 to 81 in the Appendix) is given the summary of the ratings made by these judges for the groups compared in the profile. The maximum number of votes possible at any point of difference was twenty-six, but the double-plus was very rarely used. The mean of the judges expecting a difference on any item was about seven. Usually the vote was divided, some judges expect-

ing one group to be more prejudiced, many expecting the other group to be more prejudiced in agreement with the suggested bias. Whenever one group was given a majority of six or more votes over the contrasted group, this was regarded as evidence that a real difference in prejudice might be expected. The analyzed test score, should, if valid, show a difference at each such point.

The degree of agreement may be studied in two ways. First, we may ask, "If the judges be assumed to have the more reliable insight, and if all the points at which they expected a marked difference are taken, will the tests reveal such a difference?" As indicated above, a majority of six judges expecting one group to be more prejudiced than the other, was regarded as evidence of a "marked difference." In the case of the profiles a marked difference was assumed to exist in the case of the largest differences in score, as many, in order of size, being included, as there were marked differences indicated by the judges. That is to say, in the case of two groups in which four marked differences between them were indicated by the judges, the first four differences in order of size, on the profile sheets, were considered marked differences in the test score. The results are summarized in Table XIII in the Appendix. In general, the tests showed a difference in the direction in which the judges expected a marked difference, in 91 per cent. of the predictions, and showed it to be relatively a marked difference in 81 per cent. of the cases.

The second approach can be made in the other direction. It might be true that while the tests did show differences where the judges expected them, the tests also would show many additional differences not anticipated by the judges, and presumably less valid. Therefore, the four largest differences indicated by each profile were selected and the number of judges agreeing that such a difference was to be expected and the number who would have expected the difference to be in the other direction, were tabulated. These results are given in Table XIV in the Appendix. In general it appears that 221 judges' votes would anticipate differences where the profile found them to be marked, and that 22 judges' votes would have expected the difference, but in an opposite direction. Six of the twenty-two who differ, do so in connection with the comparison between students in Wisconsin and similar students in New Jersey. Unfortunately, none of the judges who replied were familiar with both groups from first-hand experience. Hence, it

may be that a considerable proportion of the difference is to be attributed to the inexperience of the judges. Eight of the twenty-two dissenting votes occurred in the comparison between the older and younger Methodist ministers. The older ministers, on the test, registered more prejudice which agreed with the economic liberal, than did the younger men. The reason was obviously that the older men were more prejudiced in general. They had more prejudices of all kinds, radical as well as conservative, than younger men had. This, and perhaps the social radicalism of the Methodist church in general, did not seem to be adequately considered by the judges.

In general, then, it appears that the findings of the test with regard to group differences are confirmed by competent judges in something more than 80 per cent. of the cases, and that in the remaining situations there is some probability that the discrepancy is due to variables affecting the rating given by the judges.

6. It is now necessary to consider the question: Are these tests measures of something other than fair-mindedness? One ever-present danger is that a test with peculiar directions and much reading material will prove to be a measure of comprehension of reading. Two further suggestions have commonly been made. One is that the tests may measure intelligence, or at least that Forms C and D seem very much like questions used in intelligence tests. The second is that these tests take thoughtful, enlightened opinions and call them prejudices, so that the only person likely to make a low score would be a wishy-washy person of vast ignorance and no convictions.

Data available for forty normal school students make possible a correlation between the prejudice score and the score made for comprehension of reading using the Thorndike-McCall Reading Scale. The correlation is $-.005$.

The relationship to intelligence may likewise be studied in terms of correlation. Here data are available for fifty-nine students, each of whom took two or three group intelligence tests (Terman, Morgan, Illinois, Otis, or James). These scores were averaged and the resulting I. Q.'s ranged from 74 to 124. The correlation between intelligence and the prejudice score based on the whole test, was found to be $-.08$. The correlation with the prejudice score on Form C was $-.06$ and the correlation with the Form D test .09.

It is rather surprising that within this group there should be no apparent relationship between the amount of intelligence and

the amount of prejudice or of fair-mindedness. One factor seems to be that several of the most intelligent individuals of the group had been raised in sheltered middle-western homes, and had been nourished with a strong prejudice against religious radicals, liberal morals, and economic radicals. At the other end of the intelligence scale were several men who had, through knocking about in the world, acquired more years of experience and a rough-and-ready tolerance.

Form C, the Inference Test, while it seems superficially to resemble a test frequently used for intelligence, apparently is not a good measure of intelligence for the kind of group represented in college. This is due in part, of course, to the high selection, so that the intelligence required to see that one statement is more closely related to the evidence than is some other statement, is present in practically all of the persons. When an individual checked one of the incorrect conclusions, it was not because he did not see clearly a difference between that statement and the facts placed above it—it was rather because he had so strong an emotional reaction toward the statement that he required very little provocation to register his conviction that the statement was true. The hypothesis that the basis of the reaction was emotional fervor and not intellectual discrimination was even more clearly illustrated with Form D. One student was speaking the experience of many others when she said, "I see my inconsistency,—the cases are the same—but what are you going to do? This one is in the Bible!"

Certainly such an experience is not out of accord with the conclusions of psychiatrists who have dealt with that aggravated form of prejudice known as paranoia. Alert and keen insight into matters not emotionally conditioned is not uncommon. Glueck[7] says: "Memory, and the capacity to acquire new knowledge remain intact, and reasoning and judgment on matters of every-day life which do not touch his more or less circumscribed delusional field, may remain quite normal."

The other question, as to whether this is really a measure of fair-mindedness or merely a measure of empty-mindedness is answered partly by the inherent character of the test items. It is perfectly possible to express an opinion in most of the forms of the test without expressing an opinion that goes so far as to call its opponents names, to draw unwarranted conclusions or to discriminate un-

[7]Glueck, Bernard, *Studies in Forensic Psychiatry*, p. 136.

fairly against groups that are disliked. Thus, in the study of the annual conference of the American Country Life Association, reported on pages 39 and 40, it was found, using a test composed in large part of Forms A, B, and E, that the three-day conference produced a change of *opinion* on 15 per cent. of the items, but practically no change in *prejudice*.

In the Lake Geneva Y. W. C. A. conference, reported on page 37, it was discovered that during the longer conference there was an actual *reduction* of the amount of prejudice. Moreover, the reduction was apt to be greatest in those lines most discussed by the students, while on items which did not come into the conference there was little or no change.

In the study of race relations reported on pages 40 and 41, the result of more enlightenment, study, and discussion, was clearly to *decrease* the prejudices of the members of the class, as recorded by a test similar to Form F.

Even better evidence comes in the group comparisons. It is surely unreasonable to assume that the reasons why theological students at Yale Divinity School and at Union Theological Seminary are more open-minded on religious questions than is the ordinary college student, are that they have given less thought to religious questions, or are less well informed, or are empty-headed upon such subjects. Likewise, it is surely unfair to interpret the low score obtained on the test by those individuals, professors in theological seminaries and other graduate institutions, who were voted most fair-minded by their colleagues as being simply indications of ignorance or wishy-washy indecision.

There is good evidence, on the other hand, that persons can be well informed, enlightened, and at the same time strongly prejudiced on a given subject. The prejudice of the financial leader in Profile 11 was not due necessarily to ignorance of economic factors and conditions. There was a very close relationship between his study and interest in that field and his prejudice. So, likewise, the ministers of the mid-western state registered considerably more prejudice than did the college students on most religious and moral questions. This prejudice, too, correlated highly with the amount of information and interest in the field. Probably the distinction lies not in the amount of information or study but in the character and method of that study. This seems to be evidenced in the case of the contrast between those ministers who have had college and theological

training and those who have not. The latter were much more apt to have acquired their information and experience in a biased and one-sided manner.

Very evidently it is possible for a person or group to hold strong convictions, to be well informed, and not thereby to increase the prejudice score on this test. The converse situation, that of having no convictions or information and thereby making a low score, must be admitted as a possibility. Every test should recognize that causes other than the major one may be influential upon the score. A pupil may score low in a geography test because of lack of ability to read rather than because of lack of geographical information, or he may make a high score because of a working combination of slyness and dishonesty. It is not at all impossible that a person may be able to secure a low score on this test for some other reason than his fair-mindedness. He may be lacking in conviction, or he may be exceedingly wary in expressing himself on paper, or he may stupidly misread the directions. Aside from Profile No. 12, in which it seems that an individual's written reactions are much more carefully guarded than are his oral outbursts, no clear cases of other factors affecting the score have been encountered among the approximately five hundred persons, from varying environments, who have been studied.

In every case in which a very low prejudice score was made, some investigation was carried on. In all of the cases for which data were available, the person was found to be one highly respected by his associates as a person of fair, discriminating mind. In certain other cases, the subject reported his agreement with the findings of the test and shared his reasons for believing that he deserved to rate as less prejudiced than his fellows. (See especially Profiles No. 27 and 55 in the Appendix.)

It seems probable to the author that the number of persons who go about empty-minded, unable to react intellectually or emotionally to words, situations, and arguments commonly used in heated and controversial fashion by their fellowmen, has been considerably over-rated. The weak, flabby, uncertain, ill-informed people who would seem to be the best timber for such a product appear usually to register a high but inconsistent score. They hate this class of people and "adore" that idea, with little insight, reliability, or consistency. They have been called "spineless" and "vacillating" not because of their lack of reaction but because of the abundance

of reaction. They are not unaffected by any breeze, they bend with every zephyr!

Summary. What do the tests really measure? Judging by their reliability, they are a consistent measure of something. At least they are as consistent as is the ordinary group test. At least within a selected group like college students, the "something" which they measure seems not to be ability to comprehend reading, nor yet intelligence, nor even information upon these questions. If we may judge by the nature of the tests themselves, they seem to measure fair-mindedness as contrasted with prejudice or bias. This seems to be true in every form of the test. The tests as a whole appear to measure something in which persons who have been selected as very prejudiced register a very high score of 50 per cent., 60 per cent., even 70 per cent., while average students register 30 per cent. and the most fair-minded individuals register 5 per cent., 10 per cent. or 15 per cent. The tests reveal approximately the same prejudices which close acquaintances have discovered by long association. Most individuals, confronted with the results, believe them to be a fair measure of their own prejudices. The tests applied to groups show differences between those groups at the points at which competent judges would expect to find differences in prejudice. Perhaps, therefore, it may be concluded, that, unless conflicting evidence should be obtained, these tests may be regarded as usable measures of prejudice as contrasted with fair-mindedness, upon certain religious and economic issues.

CHAPTER V

SUGGESTED USES FOR THE TESTS

Probably the most obvious use for tests of fair-mindedness is to determine what the situation is in a given group or individual. Imagine a politician who is called upon to make an address before an audience of considerable importance, and about whose prejudices on the question at issue he has little or no information. What would it be worth to him to know, in advance, the direction and degree of prejudice? Not infrequently a teacher, especially in a controversial field, wastes time and effort because he does not appreciate where the bias is strongest in his students. Consider a minister entering upon a new pastorate, having dealings with a new group of officials and of young people. How many disastrous steps might be avoided, were it only practicable to administer such a test to his constituency and forewarn himself as to the prejudices which he may expect to encounter!

Even in the present, less tractable world, such surveys seem useful. Recently, a travelling secretary for the Student Friendship Fund reported that he was using a modification of Form A, in connection with his work in colleges. Coming into a strange college town, he passed out his blanks to men in dormitories and fraternity houses, scored rapidly a number of samples, and was ready when the hour for his chapel talk arrived, to avoid or meet fairly the existing prejudices of the school. On page 39 is described the experience of the discussion leaders in a national conference who had been ill advised as to the point of view and the interests of the group they were to lead. The application and study of these tests on the first day of the conference, saved the whole conference from an uncertain but probably unfortunate fate. What has been done in these situations in a rather hasty fashion, might well be done carefully and accurately by any group seeking to study the existing prejudices in certain geographical, economic, or religious groups.

A second way in which tests of this sort may prove useful was suggested in Chapter I. When investigating the need for tests of fair-mindedness, it was pointed out that the creation of accurate tests was a desirable prerequisite to the study of the effectiveness

of various teaching methods. Once such a test has been prepared, it is possible to test, in equated groups, the effectiveness of lectures, sermons, prayer-meetings, moving-pictures, pageants, group-discussions, posters, reading assignments, advertisements, and other supposed techniques for influencing public opinion.

A method of this sort was followed in studying the effectiveness of certain conferences. One of these was the Lake Geneva Y. W. C. A. student conference, held in the summer of 1924. Using a method of rotation, part of the conference took Forms A, B, and C of these tests at the beginning, and then took Forms D, E, and F at the end. The remainder of the conference, supposedly equated by chance selection, took Forms D, E, and F, at the beginning and then took Forms A, B, and C, at the end. The conference was conducted by Professor Harrison S. Elliott of Union Theological Seminary upon the principles laid down in his booklet, *The Why and How of Group Discussion*. Essentially, the method involved an endeavor to recognize the worth in points of view which differed from those which had been brought into the conference, so that after a free give-and-take of discussion and an utterly good-natured sharing of information and ideals, each person might leave the conference with more of truth than he brought to it. The main exception to this program came in dealing with certain industrial questions. Speakers were brought in to emphasize the viewpoint of large groups of working girls in the great cities.

In gross score, the groups taking Forms A, B, and C averaged 36 per cent. at the beginning of the conference, and 30 per cent. at the close. The groups taking Forms D, E, and F, registered 26 per cent. of the chances to show a prejudice at the beginning of the conference, but only 23 per cent. at the close of the conference. The comparison between the beginning-group and the end-group for each set of test forms is clearly shown in the group profiles on pages 83 and 84 of the Appendix. The slight increase evident in both cases upon economic-liberal points of view, may have been due to the influence of the speakers who stressed the necessity for economic reforms. The real significance of the changes indicated cannot, however, be definitely established until we know just what the effect of taking Forms A, B, and C is likely to be upon individuals who subsequently take Forms D, E, and F, and what the reverse effects would be.

It seems probable that in a similar fashion the tests may be used effectively in the study of curricula. For example, suppose the

students entering a theological seminary were tested at the beginning of the year, and again after a year of study. Comparison might be made between the changes taking place in the prejudices of students who had worked in the philosophy of religion, or church history, or systematic theology, with students who had worked in field situations, in the study of modern social movements, or of psychology, or religious education. The changes which have taken place in one group as compared by partial correlations or some similar method, with changes which have taken place in another group, might well prove some index of the effect of given subjects in producing prejudice or fair-mindedness. Herbert A. Sturges of the University of Chicago has made an interesting beginning upon such an experiment in some of his, *Studies in the Dynamics of Attitude.*[1] He has measured the shifts in ideas and opinion which have been due to taking certain courses in sociology, or to reading certain material. Measurement of the shifts in more deep-rooted aspects of attitude would be desirable supplements to such studies. Of course, it is not contemplated that the entire curriculum of a theological seminary, or the contents of a course in sociology, or the method of promoting foreign missions, or carrying on a political campaign, shall be determined solely by its effectiveness in producing certain degrees of prejudice or of fair-mindedness. Nevertheless, every such study, carefully made, will bring us one step nearer to a scientifically established curriculum.

Still a further line of very wide usefulness is opened up by the possibility that the content of the tests can be varied without destroying their validity as measures of prejudice. While this is not yet established, it seems probable that the evidence for validity will be significant beyond the immediate content of this set of questions which will probably be out of date in ten years. The most useful contribution may prove to be not the materials, but the method.

Thus it may be possible to substitute in Form A, words from controversial realms other than the religious or economic. It may be possible to substitute in Form B other statements upon which competent authorities might well differ; in Form C different evidence with distorted conclusions running into other fields of interest; in Form D, parallel instances from other fields of vital human experience; in Form E, arguments upon political, or international,

[1]Obtainable from H. A. Sturges, 5707 Kenwood Ave., Chicago, Ill.

or scientific questions; in Form F, generalizations about races or families or political parties or forms of literature or art or almost anything else. With comparatively simple steps in standardization, these new tests could be used to measure fair-mindedness in realms far removed from the religious or economic.

Two preliminary attempts have been made. The first was an adaptation of Form A, Form B, and selected parts of Form E, to fit the issues which might be considered by the American Country Life Association at its annual convention in 1924. The material contained some of the same test items which are in the standard Watson Test of Public Opinion, but fully three-fourths of the items dealt directly with scientific agriculture, tenant farming, consolidated schools, the Non-Partisan League, country churches, and similar issues. These new items were formulated in the same way that the original test had been formulated. (See pages 8 to 12.)[2]

The first purpose which these modified tests served, was to reveal to the leaders the actual state of affairs in the minds of the delegates. The discussion leaders had not correctly appraised the personnel of the conference. They had made their plans supposing that certain issues represented the real areas of difference in opinion among the delegates. The tests given at the opening session not only provoked interest and discussion, but revealed that the leaders had been mistaken. The prejudice reactions, by inspection, and brief tabulation, revealed real and vital issues, but not at the particular places where the leaders had expected to find them. On the issues which the leaders had planned for discussion, the conference held an almost unanimous prejudice. Only this discovery and a rapid readjustment of program prevented some hours of floundering in the limited time available for group thinking.

A second purpose which the tests served, was to record the shifts in opinion which took place between the beginning and end of the conference. In general these appeared to be toward the idea of the church as a very necessary and desirable agency in country life, but toward the idea of the church as at its best when it broadens out and serves the whole community in a modern fashion.

The third purpose which the tests served was to register the changes in prejudice which took place. The scoring system was

[2]A complete copy of the test, and a description of the conference, with a discussion of the results, may be found in the *Proceedings of the American Country Life Association, Seventh National Conference*, American Country Life Association, Grand Central Terminal, New York City.

exactly the same as that for Forms A, B, and E, so far as the gross score was concerned. Analytically, instead of studying the twelve lines of bias which the Watson test uses, six lines of bias, representing the radical and the conservative position on rural economics, religion, and community service, were used. Sixty papers were received at the beginning of the conference, and these were compared with thirty-three turned in at the close of the session. Twenty-two papers were known to be from the same person, both at the beginning and at the end. Probably all of the thirty-three were included in the original sixty. In any case, examination of the twenty-two pairs which could be identified gave the same results as did the study of the wider sampling. The summary of results is given in Table XV in the Appendix. The first line gives the gross score for the entire test, 34 per cent. at the beginning of the conference, 34 per cent. for the close of the conference. Below this are given the gross scores for each of the test forms used, and then in the lowest section of the table, the analytical score along each of the six lines of bias studied. The significant fact is that apparently this three-day conference produced no change in the average prejudice state. Opinion shifted markedly, but prejudices remained surprisingly constant.

This stability may have been due, in part, to the fact that some of the issues most warmly discussed at the conference were not in the test, and some of the issues in the test, due to the misapprehension regarding the interests of the group, did not come out into the discussion. However, if that be true, the results speak well for the reliability of the converted test.

A second adaptation was made to the needs of a class in Christianity and the Race Problem. Form F was taken as the model and generalizations about race relations were included in the test. On page 41 are given some of the statements included, indicating before each the number of persons voting "All, Most, Many, Few, or No" at the beginning of the class and similar votes after the course of six sessions.

Taking into consideration the entire forty statements, of which these are only typical samples, and expressing reactions in terms of per cent. to equate the before and after groups which were different in size, the results were as follows:

At the *beginning*, the class on the average took 20.6 per cent. of the chances to say "All," and 10.7 per cent. of the chances to say

SOME OPINIONS ON RACE RELATIONS

B. Before the course of study.
A. After the course of study.

	All	Most	Many	Few	No	?	
B.	2	13	30	0	0	2	Jews will try to get the best of a bargain if they
A.	6	3	21	5	0	1	have to cheat to do it.
B.	33	9	2	0	0	3	Positions in the industrial world should be open to
A.	18	8	3	0	0	1	any man with the ability to fill them, regardless of racial traits.
B.	16	7	7	0	8	9	Colored people should go to schools, hotels, thea-
A.	3	8	5	3	1	5	tres, etc., patronized exclusively by colored people, thus preventing some inter-racial contacts.
B.	1	22	24	0	1	0	White people feel some antagonism toward negroes.
A.	0	14	15	1	0	0	
B.	0	10	28	9	0	0	White people feel some antagonism toward Jap-
A.	0	4	23	2	0	1	anese or Chinese.
B.	1	1	11	25	4	5	White people feel some antagonism toward Indians.
A.	0	3	7	16	0	4	
B.	8	16	17	3	1	2	Negroes emit an odor which is characteristic of
A.	3	8	13	2	1	3	their race, and which white people find disagree- able.
B.	6	20	12	3	3	3	Persons of pure Nordic stock are superior in
A.	0	10	12	3	2	3	intelligence to negroes.
B.	4	15	5	11	8	4	"Pure blooded" members of a race are superior to
A.	1	4	9	10	3	3	those of mixed stock.
B.	2	13	11	9	6	7	Negroes are more prone to commit sexual offense
A.	0	5	13	9	0	3	than is the average white man.
B.	28	14	3	2	0	0	Small children who have not been prejudiced by
A.	13	14	2	0	0	1	others, will play with children of other races, quite unconscious of racial differences.
B.	17	3	2	3	13	9	Persons who refuse to give to a negro the same
A.	8	4	4	5	4	4	social recognition which they would give to a white person of similar character, are unworthy to be called Christians.
B.	1	12	16	12	0	6	Japanese would be crafty and even treacherous,
A.	0	2	16	11	0	1	if necessary, to secure the dominance of their nation.
B.	0	12	22	6	2	4	Racial difficulties are caused by the desire of the
A.	0	4	19	5	0	2	white people to gain and control the resources of the world.
B.	7	3	1	12	14	11	Persons of one race should be permitted, with
A.	6	7	3	6	4	4	mutual consent, to marry persons of another race.
B.	5	9	7	14	1	11	Colonies now held by white nations should very
A.	3	13	6	5	0	3	soon become entirely independent.

"No," or 31.3 per cent. of the chances to register an "extreme" or "prejudiced" statement. Suppose now that these be classified as "liberal" meaning "all-men-are-of-one-blood" in tone, or "conservative," meaning "in-the-*status-quo*-we-are-on-top, and-it-would best-be-left-alone." Then 58 per cent. of the prejudices were liberal, and 42 per cent. were conservative.

At the *end* of the class, the average took 13.6 per cent. of the chances to say "All," and 7.9 per cent. of the chances to say "No," or 21.5 per cent. of the chances to register an extreme or prejudiced statement. Of these, 70 per cent. were liberal and 30 per cent. were conservative.

The class as a whole appeared to become more fair-minded, but seemed to drop conservative prejudices faster than liberal prejudices. This rests, however, on the assumption that the thirty persons who were in the class at the end, were a fair sample of the forty-seven present at the beginning. It may well be that part of the change was due to the dropping out of the more prejudiced, and more conservatively prejudiced persons. However, all of the thirty were included in the forty-seven, and the instructor's opinion was that the most prejudiced persons had preferred to stay in the group, rather than drop out of it.

Experiments in the improvement of methods and curricula, and the measurement of educational ventures in other than religious or economic realms seem to offer immediate, constructive service. However, it may be that even greater possibilities will be found to lie in realms which seem to be less practical, and which may be purely scientific research. For example, it is possible by use of such tests to select individuals who are remarkably prejudiced, and others who are remarkably fair-minded. These individuals might then be carefully studied, with a view to finding the factors which have entered significantly into the experience of one type of individual, as contrasted with the significant factors in the experience of the other type. It seems probable that the application of the techniques of the social case-worker and of the psychoanalyst might discover very fruitful sources of prejudice and methods for its elimination.

The reactions which individuals made to their own profiles suggests the need for another study, endeavoring to find out the ways in which individuals "interpret, excuse, rationalize" or, otherwise, defend their prejudices. How far can self-report be trusted, within

the realm where some praise or blame might be expected from others? How is insight into the real nature and origin of one's prejudices best acquired?

Again, a need is evidenced by this study, for a keener analysis of "facts," "evidence," and "arguments." These techniques have long been held in high esteem as methods of influencing public opinion.[1] However, these tests reveal that different people react with widely different attitudes to the same facts and arguments. Is there some method by which these prejudice factors can be reduced to terms of least common denominators, so evidence can be "weighed" alike by people at different points of a prejudice scale? Will it be possible to "try out" propaganda material upon groups selected because of different degrees and directions of prejudice, in such a way as to find out the reactions it produces, and to compare the effectiveness of different forms?

Quite evidently there are other possibilities in the study of the relationship between prejudice and emotional instability, or other personality traits. Perhaps for certain types of work, for example, social research, the selection of personnel will be found to be facilitated by such tests of fair-mindedness as have been developed here.

It is probably true of this research, as of most of others, that it begins with one problem and ends in a maze of problems. The curious child reaches to pick up a twig, lying exposed on the bare ground, but finds that it leads him on and on, for it is one small root of a great tree.

[1]Lippman, Walter, *Public Opinion.*

APPENDIX

PREJUDICE PROFILES AND STATISTICAL TABLES

INDIVIDUAL PROFILES

Profile No. 1

This man is a farmer in a small Wyoming town. He is the leading pillar in the Methodist church. When I visited one Sunday he was drilling the children in the Sunday School on the names of the persons and the significant details of each of the Old Testament miracles. His neighbors consider him, next to———, the most stubborn man they have known. He is a rank-and-file member of the Farm Bureau, so should share some of their progressive economic ideas.

Profile No. 2

The Methodist minister in the Wyoming town. A young man of the hero-worshipper type. He is inclined to follow Harry F. Ward on radical economic ideas. On religious matters he is generally unsettled at present. He has strong inclinations toward the "social gospel," and strongly opposes war. Fairly stable on the value of religion, preaching, etc. Has "improper" thoughts, and wants to be a "good fellow", but is strongly under the domination of his wife, who is an old-style executive, "come-upper" minister's wife.

PROFILE NO. 1


PER CENT OF PREJUDICE AGREEING WITH:
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals
13. Against Economic Status Quo
14. Against Economic Radicals
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists
16. Against Religious Radicals
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery
18. Against Any Form of Religion

PROFILE NO. 2


PER CENT OF PREJUDICE AGREEING WITH:
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals
13. Against Economic Status Quo
14. Against Economic Radicals
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists
16. Against Religious Radicals
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery
18. Against Any Form of Religion

Profile No. 3

My chief feeling concerning my friend, is that she is a person of very liberal ideas in almost every way, but that she is much freer in her ideas than in her correspondent conduct. This, perhaps, is of no particular value for your purpose.

So far as my evaluation of your diagnosis of her goes, I think in the main that it is very fair. She is undoubtedly a person of strong bias against anything savoring of complusion or orthodoxy in religion. Quite inconsistently, however, she is often a valiant champion of the Roman Catholic faith, more from the aesthetic appeal, I believe, than from any conviction of its rightness of doctrine or organization. She also has a great fear of and scorn for religious intolerance, which leads her to champion those who are religiously maligned (maligned in religious matters, I should say) by her particular group.

One part of your diagnosis I do not agree with. I think she does not lean toward the "social gospel" of anything, let alone religious work. She is an individualist absolute, except as she is conditioned by her own rather childlike relation to her family, and to her mother in particular. Her particularly pet idea is that she is willing to let all others do as they care to so long as she is free to pursue her own likes and dislikes. She would have a decidedly more favorable reaction to the word "capitalist" than to the word "sharing," etc.

Profile No. 4

————is one of the parlor radical type. "Emancipated" probably to the reaction stage against conventional morals, religion, education, art. She smokes and reads *Rabelais*. She is probably something of a Rand School type, although I am not sure of this. She thinks she has little use for religion.

PROFILE NO. 3

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists	
16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



PROFILE NO. 4

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
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16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



PROFILE NO. 5

I would say this individual was prejudiced against organized religious ideas and strongly in favor of capitalistic points of view.

PROFILE NO. 6

I should say this individual was the least prejudiced person I had ever known.

PROFILE NO. 5

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists	
16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	

PROFILE NO. 6

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion: Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists	
16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



Profile No. 11

I consider this man one of the most prejudiced individuals I have ever known. He is so much of a fundamentalist that he gleefully condemns to the nethermost hell any person who suggests that heaven is not up above the clouds, a real, existing place. He has been a leader in finance, connected with one of the greatest banking institutions of the country. He said to me at one time, "I should like to see every socialist with a millstone around his neck thrown into the deepest part of the ocean." Oddly enough, however, although he belongs to a denomination which has prohibited many forms of amusement, he is inclined to take a much less stringent view of such questions. He said, for example, that as far as he was concerned he would rather have the young people dance in the church than out in the dance-hall.

Profile No. 12

I believe this person to be very dogmatic in religious matters, less so in economic matters, but on the whole to be bigoted and prejudiced. . . . (Later comment) He is, however very cautious about expressing himself in writing. He is very finicky about expressing himself in words. It may be well that this would interfere with a real exhibition of prejudice on such a test.

PROFILE NO. 11

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists	
16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



PROFILE NO. 12

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal: for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo: Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion: Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
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

PROFILE NO. 25

I consider this reaction very indicative of my prejudices.

PROFILE NO. 26

Form A gave me some rather striking revelations regarding my own prejudices. I was brought up in Massachusetts and there imbibed in early life a very deep-seated antagonism to the Roman Catholic Church. Intellectually, this has been entirely modified in later life and I now have in many respects a very decided respect for Catholicism. I find, however, that when it comes to an immediate reaction my early prejudices crop out. I can see no particular reason for my negative reaction to the name of President Coolidge unless it be that I have always been a Democrat. Prohibition is an unpleasant word to me although I have always voted "dry." I think that I have a rather strong feeling against anything that smacks of smugness.

PROFILE NO. 25

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal: for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists	
16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	

PROFILE NO. 26

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo: Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion: Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
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17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



Profile No. 27

The score of 15 per cent. and the low prejudice profile seems right in my case, because I am always very cautious about taking an extreme position. Nor do I find persons of different opinion objectionable to me. I can generally see their way of thinking.

Profile No. 28

I feel that this is fair except in cases 17 and 18 which are almost 0 per cent. in my case.

PROFILE NO.27

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists	
16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	

PROFILE NO.28

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal: for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo: Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion: Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists	
16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



Profile No. 31

I consider it a misnomer to call this a prejudice test excepting in the sense of its being a test of the prejudices of the compiler. To consider it fair-minded, for instance, to believe it wrong to expect all physically-able Christians to attend a church service is absurd! It is a test of convictions as well as of prejudices and the weakness of the test is its failure to differentiate between prejudice and conviction. The profile sheet does not chart my mind very accurately.

Profile No. 32

I think this test is worth while. In my own case I think the test is fairly satisfactory. In numbers 2, 3, and 6 I think the Prejudice Profile is a little severe. It is too severe in number 11.

PROFILE NO 31

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
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16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



PROFILE NO. 32

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
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16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



Profile No. 45

I feel that this test is fair—with the exception to the fact that I believe every man needs to be prejudiced on some of these questions —and when he is, he should not be said to be unfair-minded.

Profile No. 46

I have a decided feeling that the term fair-minded is not used correctly. That the high commendation given to those lacking in virile moral convictions is unfortunate. For example, can we judge the 10 per cent. students at Columbia more in harmony with highest principles of life than the students at Union Seminary? I rather doubt it. In moral issues which group would be more defendable and aroused?

Should there not also be a distinction between prejudice on things which should not call for it, such as "Bolshevik," and those which are morally wrong, such as "K. K. K.?"

I am very much interested, however, in the questionnaire. It has many fine features.

PROFILE NO. 45

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists	
16. Against Religious Radicals	
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



PROFILE NO. 46

Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1. Economic Radical	
2. Economic Liberal; for Mild Reforms	
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist	
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace	
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism	
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism	
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism	
8. Religious Radical	
9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics	
10. Roman Catholicism: Opposing Protestants	
11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship	
12. Freedom, License, Uncensored Morals	
13. Against Economic Status Quo	
14. Against Economic Radicals	
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17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery	
18. Against Any Form of Religion	



Profile No. 55

(Note: This person, a graduate student in educational psychology, made the lowest score of any person to whom the test has been given. She was asked to describe her personality, past experience, and present opinions and convictions. Extracts covering all the main points in her reply are given below).

The exceptionally low score does not surprise me; it seems to me quite valid in general, the result of a combination of circumstances of nature and environment, somewhat different from those of the ordinary college group. I have made rather extreme scores in other cases.


PROFILE NO. 55
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Per Cent of Prejudice Agreeing with:
1. Economic Radical
2. Economic Liberal: for Mild Reforms
3. Economic Status Quo; Capitalist
4. Social Gospel: Industry; Race; Peace
5. Personal Communion; Mysticism
6. Orthodox Fundamentalism
7. Modernism; Christian Liberalism
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9. Protestantism: Opposing Roman Catholics
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11. Strict, Puritanical Moral Censorship
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13. Against Economic Status Quo
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16. Against Religious Radicals
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery
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One needs a certain mentality to follow the argument where it leads, and according to intelligence tests, Ihave that. With intelligence, I think there usually goes a tendency toward diffuse interests, a curiosity as to reasons for environmental conditions, a satisfaction in understanding the more subtle elements of experience. On the side of emotion I find a host of old fears that are hard to control, making for inhibitions of all kinds, also a set of quixotic over-suggestible sympathies, pulling me always toward the side of the under-dog, the unpopular cause. As to McDougall's third factor, impulse, I am slow, deliberate, indecisive, with an inertia that makes action hard to start and hard to stop. In case you know the Downey Will-Profile I will enclose one made a year or so ago, with the list of traits as I checked it then.

Speed of Movement	7	Reaction to Opposition	9
Freedom from Load	8	Finality of Judgment	8
Flexibility	8	Motor Inhibition	10
Speed of Decision	5	Interest in Detail	9
Motor Impulsion	5	Coördination of Impulses	10
Reaction to Contradiction	10	Volitional Perseveration	10

Eight years of comparative leisure in a cosmopolitan city, abroad, gave me the advantage of a wide variety of friends of different races, classes, beliefs, and interests, from every part of the world. The complexity of social conditions and the genuineness of widely diverse points of view came home to me vividly.

With such a nature, schooling, and experience is it strange that I should reserve decisions, reconsider all kinds of arguments, and make all possible allowances, in such a way as to give me a low score on this test? The "All" or "No" response is utterly foreign to me. Whatever my own opinions, such matters are phenomena for study rather than cases for action on my part; the behavior of persons concerned is to me a matter for interpretation rather than simple praise or blame, for study into sources, and the enormous complexity of social causes and results.

The purpose of the test seemed clear to me from the first page, and it surprised me to learn in the seminar that it is not generally recognized. Perhaps my experience with tests and their construction gave me the clue. However, I do not think there is any item I could change without further explanation of the item or more information on the subject. It is part of my four year's experience with tests that an artificial or manipulated score is of no interest to anyone. Material like this test often comes into the seminar in its preliminary stages for discussion or criticism, and I did not know that the paper would be scored, or that the scoring method had been developed. . . . On the whole then, I do not think my knowledge of the purpose of the test made a difference in the response. It is for you to estimate how much unconscious influence there may have been. I had no reason for wanting to make an extreme score, and expect that any valid score would be rather low.

. . . . . .

I remember three items that I underscored (in the Form A test) *Military Preparedness;*—There is a real antipathy here, an emotional bias. I am sympathetic with the pacifist ideal of being unwilling to think in terms of war as possible. That seems to me in line with true, spiritual, social growth. However, on the mental side, I have some doubt of the pragmatic validity of this method at present.

I can at least see room for doubt on the part of sincere, broad-minded people. *Damn:* The bias here is against impulsive lack of self-control rather than any over-sensitive puritanism. *Cigarettes:* The repellant factor here is the connotation of stunted child growth, and of associated moral conditions that are bad for children. I have had some amusement in watching the disappearance of the part of this prejudice that relates to "cigars" and "tobacco," which was a strong one some years ago, through reading and also through observation of special cases of smoking among men and women I otherwise admired, where I could detect no proof of injury.

As to the profile, if there is any reliability in these differences my greatest prejudice is against superstition, mystery and magic. This seems logical, for I definitely prefer and believe in, scientific interpretations. Also, I seem to have most of the points on religious, rather than economic issues, which ought to be fair, for it seems to me easier to keep the objective point of view in economics than in religion, which is more of a personal matter.

My interest, knowledge and information are about that of the average college graduate. While abroad, I took two courses in sociology and economics, six points each, for the interest of them, as the credit would not count in graduate work. The professor was a singularly thoughtful, fair-minded, elderly man, who was always trying to get people to read the literature of the group they opposed. I have had only one course here in that line, Mr. Shenton's in Community Organization. I was able to attend a unit course with Dr. Coe, for the interest of it. Last year I enjoyed Sir Arthur Thompson's lectures on Science and Religion enough to cut one of my own classes for it, a thing I have almost never done. I have grown up in the church, and have attended regularly when health and strength permitted. I am still keeping in active touch with my home church, a union church which has gathered its members from perhaps forty or fifty denominations, with very liberal preaching. I appreciate highly Dr. Fosdick's preaching and books. One of my sisters lived for ten years in a South-Side Chicago settlement, finally as head, and my visits there, and her letters kept alive that kind of interest. I have held a coöperating subscription in the *Survey* for ten or twelve years at least, although I am sorry to say my course reading at college has rather crowded out that on social problems of late. I was interested enough in the tests to want to

discuss the subject matter with my friend the Y. W. C. A. Industrial secretary in———and to get her to fill one out. So far as I can see, my basis of interest and fact compares reasonably well with that of others who have not specialized in these fields.

Some samples of statements on the topics given may best illustrate the opinions and convictions which I hold.

I do not approve of the economic *status quo* but feel that the truest method of change is evolution, not revolution. I have seen sincere and earnest capitalists and sincere and earnest working people studying to find the next steps in progress, and I think the problem is not one for any easy panacea, but for technical and scientific study, and long patience. Those who offer simple, easy solutions have hardly seen all phases of the situation. . . . Until religion becomes an integral part of human social life, no manipulation of economic forces will bring a working solution. However, no amount of dreaming will take the place of the study needed.

I approve of profit-sharing, think it very helpful in many cases, but do not feel well enough acquainted with business conditions and with types of profit-sharing, to feel sure that it would do more good than harm at present in all cases. 'Continuity of labor varies a good deal in different situations, responsibility accordingly. Causes and effects are difficult to disentangle.

I should be glad to see the Child Labor Amendment passed, so far as my present information goes, although I have heard that there has been a trend of opinion away from it among thoughtful people. Where children need protection from the evils of society today, in order that a better foundation may be had for the future, I think the children should have the benefit of the doubt. If I were to vote on the issue, I should certainly try to get more information first.

In the Prohibition issue, I believe there are many social benefits which are less advertised than the damage we hear so much of. I am grateful for these benefits, and hope that they may be saved for the coming generation. I do not think prohibition can be fairly tested in one generation. The closely involved issue of law enforcement, as a matter of a national habit of thinking, makes it a serious question whether the amendment did not come before the public opinion which makes laws reasonably valid. . . . There seems to be a combination against effective prohibition, of

moneyed interests which would profit by the sale of liquor, and of persons so habituated to its use that they are not open to argument, and of others who have tried to weigh the conditions fairly and who see the coërcion involved as a greater evil than the sale of liquor.

I hope I am more than one per-cent for the Social Gospel. As I understand it, society is composed of individuals and religion must work through human lives one by one. The importance of personality is not decreased by the importance of social relationships, but rather increased. Social salvation will come only through the salvation of individuals in their social relationships.

Apparently, I registered some prejudice in agreement with Catholicism. . . . From scraps of experience, conversations, overheard, etc., I had the idea that Catholic priests were required to have something corresponding to a college education as a foundation for theological training, (very likely a narrow type from the scientific point of view) while Methodist candidates are not required to have a college preparation. I judged accordingly that Catholics would have higher standing in education and general culture. I have had very little direct experience with either, but have seen both sincerity and high spiritual values in some phases of Catholicism. I think their fundamental assumptions are false, their control of thought is pernicious, and I believe that the power motive, rather than the religious motive, has been back of much of the history of the Roman church. I am a thorough Protestant in my own point of view, however, with respect for the spiritual realities which many come to, through the Roman Church, and for many beautiful traditions which are as much a part of Protestant as of Roman religious history, literature, and art.

Similarly among Fundamentalists I have seen sincerity, spiritual values, in many cases real beauty of character, and self-forgetful devotion to ideals. I think the fundamentalist point of view intellectually wrong, static, out of harmony with evolutionary growth and with the essential harmony of all truth; therefore, a possible source of very real danger to the development of religious life, especially among the younger generation. . . . .

I have seen too much fineness of character in Buddhist, Confucianist, and Jewish friends to doubt that real spiritual values exist here. Some small contact with Christian Science, Theosophy, the Bahai cult, etc., has been enough to make me considerate of values that others find in them. I would expect to find that any

religion which has continued long appealing to any large group of men, has had some spiritual value. This does not mean that I agree with any one of them. I am convinced of the moral value and the spiritual benefit of the concept of progressive development toward unlimited ends, which modern Protestant Christianity connotes. I believe that Christianity is the best hope of the future, but that it will come to ally itself with truth wherever found, and that it will seek to overcome selfishness in the West as well as "false gods" in the Orient.

GROUP PROFILES

RATINGS OF JUDGES ON PROFILE I

METHODIST MINISTERS IN A MID-WESTERN STATE
COMPARED WITH
STUDENTS ENTERING UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH	Number of Judges Expecting Methodist Ministers To Be More Prejudiced	Number of Judges Expecting Students Entering Union Theological Seminary To Be More Prejudiced	Marked Differences
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism	0	7	X
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms	3	8	
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals	9	2	X
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.	1	4	
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.	8	0	X
6. Fundamentalism	10	0	X
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism	3	6	
8. Religious Radical	2	6	
9. Protestantism	7	0	X
10. Roman Catholicism	2	1	
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements	9	0	X
12. Free, Loose Morals	0	3	

Two judges state merely that the ministers will be more prejudiced on almost everything.

PREJUDICE PROFILES I


Key
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Methodist Ministers in a Mid-Western State
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Students Entering Union Theological Seminary
Prejudice in Agreement with:
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.
6. Fundamentalism
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism
10. Roman Catholicism
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements
12. Free, Loose Morals

RATINGS OF JUDGES ON PROFILE II

Roman Catholic Students in a Normal School Compared with Protestant Students in the Same School

Prejudice in Agreement With	Number of Judges Expecting Roman Catholics To Be More Prejudiced	Number of Judges Expecting Protestants To Be More Prejudiced	Marked Difference
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism	1	4	
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms	1	3	
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals	1	2	
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.	1	5	
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.	10	1	X
6. Fundamentalism	10	1	X
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism	0	9	X
8. Religious Radical	3	6	
9. Protestantism	0	14	X
10. Roman Catholicism	14	0	X
11. Strict, Puritanical Morals and Amusements	2	5	
12. Free, Loose Morals	4	2	

PREJUDICE PROFILES II


KEY
Indicates More Prejudice On Part of Roman Catholic Students in a Normal School
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Protestant Students in the Same School
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH:
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.
6. Fundamentalism
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism
10. Roman Catholicism
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements
12. Free, Loose Morals

RATINGS OF JUDGES ON PROFILE III

METHODIST MINISTERS UNDER FORTY YEARS OF AGE
COMPARED WITH
METHODIST MINISTERS IN THE SAME CONFERENCE, OVER FORTY YEARS OF AGE

PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH	Number of Judges Expecting Methodist Ministers Under Forty Years of Age To Be More Prejudiced:	Number of Judges Expecting Methodist Ministers Over Forty Years of Age To Be More Prejudiced:	Marked Differences
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism	7	2	
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms	8	2	X
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals	1	9	X
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.	8	3	
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.	0	6	X
6. Fundamentalism	0	11	X
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism	9	2	X
8. Religious Radical	3	2	
9. Protestantism	0	7	X
10. Roman Catholicism	1	1	
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements	0	11	X
12. Free, Loose Morals	3	2	

Three judges state merely that the older ministers will be more prejudiced on almost everything.

PREJUDICE PROFILES III


KEY
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Methodist Ministers Under Forty Years of Age
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Methodist Ministers in the Same Conference over Forty Years of Age
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH:
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast With Individual Salvation, etc.
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.
6. Fundamentalism
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism
10. Roman Catholicism
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements
12. Free, Loose Morals

RATINGS OF JUDGES ON PROFILE IV

Methodist Ministers Having Had Less Than College Education Compared with Methodist Ministers Having Had College and Theological Seminary Training

Prejudice in Agreement with	Number of Judges Expecting Uneducated Ministers To Be More Prejudiced	Number of Judges Expecting Highly Trained Ministers To Be More Prejudiced	Marked Differences
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism	1	6	
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms	1	7	
3. Capitalist Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals	6	1	
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.	1	6	
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.	5	0	
6. Fundamentalism	9	0	X
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism	0	9	X
8. Religious Radical	3	8	
9. Protestantism	6	0	X
10. Roman Catholicism	1	1	
11. Strict, Puritanical Morals and Amusements	9	1	X
12. Free, Loose Morals	0	1	

Three judges state merely that the uneducated ministers will be more prejudiced along almost every line.

PREJUDICE PROFILES IV


KEY
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Methodist Ministers Having Had less than College Education
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Methodist Ministers Having Had College and Theological Seminary Training.
PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH:
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.
6. Fundamentalism
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism
10. Roman Catholicism
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements
12. Free, Loose Morals

RATINGS OF JUDGES ON PROFILE V

Students in Normal School
Compared with
Methodist Ministers in the Same Mid-Western State

Prejudice in Agreement with	Number of Judges Expecting Normal School Students To Be More Prejudiced	Number of Judges Expecting Methodist Ministers To Be More Prejudiced	Marked Differences
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism	7	2	
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms	5	3	
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals	2	5	
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.	5	1	
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.	0	8	X
6. Fundamentalism	0	9	X
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism	6	2	
8. Religious Radical	4	2	
9. Protestantism	0	9	X
10. Roman Catholicism	4	2	
11. Strict, Puritanical Morals and Amusements	1	11	X
12. Free, Loose Morals	6	0	X

PREJUDICE PROFILES V


KEY
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Students in Normal School
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Methodist Ministers in the Same Mid-Western State.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH:
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.
6. Fundamentalism
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism
10. Roman Catholicism
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements
12. Free, Loose Morals

RATINGS OF JUDGES ON PROFILE VI

NORMAL SCHOOL STUDENTS IN A NEW JERSEY SCHOOL
COMPARED WITH
NORMAL SCHOOL STUDENTS IN A WISCONSIN SCHOOL

PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH	Number of Judges Expecting Normal School Students in a New Jersey School To Be More Prejudiced	Number of Judges Expecting Normal School Students in a Wisconsin School To Be More Prejudiced	Marked Differences
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism	1	7	X
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms	2	8	X
3. Capitalist Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals	6	2	
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.	1	6	
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.	4	1	
6. Fundamentalism	6	2	
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism	1	4	
8. Religious Radical	1	5	
9. Protestantism	1	1	
10. Roman Catholicism	1	0	
11. Strict, Puritanical Morals and Amusements	3	1	
12. Free, Loose Morals	0	2	

One judge states that no difference can reasonably be expected.

PREJUDICE PROFILES VI


KEY
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Normal School Students in a New Jersey School
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Normal School Students in a Wisconsin School
PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH:
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.
6. Fundamentalism
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism
10. Roman Catholicism
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements
12. Free, Loose Morals

RATINGS OF JUDGES ON PROFILE VII

Theological Students in Union Theological Seminary Compared with Students in Christian Ethics at Yale Divinity School

Prejudice in Agreement with	Number of Judges Expecting Union Theological Seminary Students To Be More Prejudiced	Number of Judges Expecting Yale Divinity School Students To Be More Prejudiced	Marked Differences
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism	7	1	X
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms	4	2	
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals	2	6	
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.	4	2	
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.	2	4	
6. Fundamentalism	1	7	X
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism	4	2	
8. Religious Radical	4	3	
9. Protestantism	2	3	
10. Roman Catholicism	0	0	
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements	0	8	X
12. Free, Loose Morals	4	0	

Two judges state merely that the Yale students may be expected to be more prejudiced in general on such issues.

PREJUDICE PROFILES VII

KEY

Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Theological Students in Union Theological Seminary

Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Students in Christian Ethics at Yale Divinity School



PREJUDICE PROFILES VIII


KEY
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Ordinary Students of Union Theological Seminary
Indicates More Prejudice on Part of Persons Voted To Be Most Open-Minded
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH:
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.
6. Fundamentalism
7. Christian Modernism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism
10. Roman Catholicism
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements
12. Free, Loose Morals

PREJUDICE PROFILES IX

FORMS A, B, C—LAKE GENEVA STUDENT Y. W. C. A. CONFERENCE



PREJUDICE PROFILES X

FORMS D, E, F—LAKE GENEVA STUDENT Y. W. C. A. CONFERENCE


KEY
Indicates More Prejudice Beginning of Conference
Indicates More Prejudice End of Conference
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
PREJUDICE IN AGREEMENT WITH:
1. Radical on Economic Questions, Opposed to Capitalism
2. Economic Liberal, Desiring Mild Reforms
3. Capitalist, Favoring Economic Status Quo and Opposing Radicals
4. Social Gospel, in Contrast with Individual Salvation, etc.
5. Personal Communion, Mysticism, etc.
6. Fundamentalism
7. Christian Modernism, Liberalism
8. Religious Radical
9. Protestantism
10. Roman Catholicism
11. Strict Puritanical Morals and Amusements
12. Free, Loose Morals
13. Against Economic Status Quo
14. Against Economic Radicals
15. Against Religious Fundamentalists
16. Against Religious Radicals
17. Against Superstition, Magic, Mystery
18. Against Any Form of Religion

STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE I

NORMS FOR GROSS SCORE—ARRANGED BY GROUPS

Group	Number	Mean	S. D.
Normal School Students	102	32.0%	8.9
Persons Selected as Fair-Minded	13	13.0	5.8
Persons Selected as Very Prejudiced	5	61.4	8.8
Methodist Ministers (In One Mid-Western State)	35	36.8	12.1
Students in Union Theological Seminary	46	25.2	8.5
Students in Yale Divinity School	71	26.4	9.0
Miscellaneous College Graduates	39	26.6	12.7
TOTAL GROUP	311	29.1%	11.3%

TABLE II

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS SCORE

311 CASES

Gross Score in Per Cent	Number
0— 4.9	2
5— 9.9	3
10—14.9	22
15—19.9	35
20—24.9	54
25—29.9	51
30—34.9	57
35—39.9	35
40—44.9	26
45—49.9	11
50—54.9	8
55—59.9	2
60—64.9	1
65—69.9	3
70—74.9	1

TABLE III

Rating of Arguments—Test E-10

Note: The roman numerals in the first column on the left correspond to the questions in the test. Beneath each, the arabic numerals are listed, one for each argument. The second column indicates the side of the question supported by the argument. The third column indicates the rating *strong* or *weak*, which is presumed. The fourth column lists in its two subdivisions the vote of the twelve judges selected by the author. The fifth column in similar fashion lists the ratings given by the twelve persons who were most fair-minded, as judged by the rest of the test. In the sixth column the per cent of the twenty-four judges who agreed with the test rating, is given.

Argument Number	Side of Issue	Test Rating	Original Judges		Most Fair-Minded		Per Cent of Both, Agreeing with Test
			Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak	
I.							
1.	Yes	Strong	12	0	9	3	88%
2.	No	Weak	1	11	3	9	83
3.	No	Strong	12	0	12	0	100
4.	Yes	Weak	0	12	2	10	92
5.	No	Weak	1	11	1	11	92
6.	Yes	Weak	0	8	1	11	95
II.							
1.	No	Strong	11	1	12	0	96%
2.	No	Weak	0	12	1	11	96
3.	Yes	Weak	0	12	0	12	100
4.	Yes	Strong	10	2	11	1	88
5.	No	Weak	1	11	3	9	83
6.	Yes	Weak	0	12	1	11	96
III.							
1.	Yes	Weak	0	12	0	12	100%
2.	Yes	Strong	9	3	7	5	67
3.	No	Strong	12	0	11	1	96
4.	Yes	Strong	9	3	10	2	79
5.	No	Strong	11	1	11	1	92
6.	No	Weak	3	9	3	9	75
IV.							
1.	Yes	Strong	10	2	7	5	71%
2.	Yes	Weak	2	10	6	6	67
3.	No	Weak	0	12	2	10	92
4.	Yes	Strong	12	0	12	0	100
5.	No	Weak	2	10	4	8	75
6.	No	Strong	12	0	11	1	96

TABLE III (*Continued*)

Argument Number	Side of Issue	Test Rating	Original Judges		Most Fair-Minded		Per Cent of Both, Agreeing with Test
			Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak	
V.							
1.	Yes	Weak	1	11	6	6	71%
2.	No	Weak	1	11	1	11	92
3.	No	Strong	12	0	10	2	92
4.	Yes	Strong	10	2	11	1	88
5.	Yes	Strong	9	3	11	1	83
6.	No	Weak	0	12	4	8	93
VI.							
1.	Yes	Weak	1	11	4	8	79%
2.	No	Strong	11	1	7	5	75
3.	Yes	Strong	12	0	12	0	100
4.	Yes	Strong	9	3	7	5	67
5.	No	Weak	0	12	4	8	83
6.	No	Weak	0	12	2	10	92
VII.							
1.	No	Weak	1	11	5	7	75%
2.	No	Strong	10	2	6	6	67
3.	Yes	Strong	11	1	9	3	83
4.	Yes	Strong	12	0	12	0	100
5.	Yes	Weak	0	12	3	9	88
6.	No	Weak	0	12	1	11	96
VIII.							
1.	Yes	Weak	0	12	0	12	100%
2.	Yes	Strong	12	0	12	0	100
3.	No	Strong	10	2	7	5	71
4.	No	Weak	1	11	1	11	92
5.	Yes	Weak	0	12	1	11	96
6.	No	Strong	11	1	10	2	88
IX.							
1.	Yes	Weak	1	11	4	8	79%
2.	No	Weak	0	12	0	12	100
3.	No	Strong	12	0	10	2	92
4.	Yes	Strong	10	2	10	2	83
5.	Yes	Strong	11	1	9	3	83
6.	No	Strong	9	3	8	4	71

TABLE III (*Continued*)

Argument Number	Side of Issue	Test Rating	Original Judges		Most Fair-Minded		Per Cent of Both, Agreeing with Test
			Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak	
X.							
1.	Yes	Weak	0	12	1	11	96%
2.	Yes	Strong	10	2	8	4	75
3.	No	Weak	0	12	1	11	96
4.	No	Strong	9	3	12	0	88
5.	Yes	Strong	10	2	12	0	92
6.	No	Strong	12	0	12	0	100
XI.							
1.	Yes	Weak	1	11	6	6	71%
2.	No	Strong	10	2	7	5	71
3.	No	Strong	12	0	6	6	75
4.	Yes	Strong	11	1	11	1	92
5.	No	Weak	3	9	2	10	79
6.	Yes	Weak	1	7	0	12	96
XII.							
1.	Yes	Strong	8	4	7	5	63%
2.	No	Strong	12	0	9	3	88
3.	Yes	Weak	1	11	1	11	92
4.	No	Weak	1	11	0	12	96
5.	No	Strong	11	1	6	6	71
6.	Yes	Strong	9	3	6	6	63

TABLE IV

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR GROSS SCORE ON EACH FORM
133 CASES

TEST FORM	MEAN	S. D.
A	28.9	11.5
B	40.9	19.8
C	27.1	20.5
D	44.3	20.8
E	37.6	20.9
F	16.7	12.5
TOTAL TEST (311 Cases)	29.1	11.3

TABLE V

SELF CORRELATION OF GROSS SCORE
117 CASES

TEST FORM	SELF CORRELATION
A	.91
B	.90
C	.85
D	.67
E	.66
F	.78
TOTAL TEST (161 Cases)	.96

TABLE VI

SELF CORRELATION OF THE EIGHTEEN ANALYTICAL LINES OF BIAS

Direction of Bias	Self-r 30 Papers	Self-r 61 Papers	Maximum Number of Points	Probable Self-r on 200 Such Points (70 Items)
I	.74	.69	189	.70
II	.39	.51	93	.69
III	.68	.59	192	.60
IV	.84	.69	188	.70
V	.82	.84	143	.88
VI	.94	.79	182	.81
VII	.81	.60	89	.77
VIII	.97	.80	164	.83
IX	.64	.35	58	.65
X	.51	.52	66	.77
XI	.78	.69	107	.81
XII	.70	.46	94	.65
XIII	.75	.67	188	.68
XIV	.54	.49	205	.49
XV	.40	.58	151	.65
XVI	.68	.84	151	.88
XVII	.46	.58	86	.76
XVIII	.85	.78	182	.80

Note: Only the first twelve are now used in analytical scoring.

TABLE VII

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GROSS SCORES FOR EACH TEST FORM WITH GROSS SCORES FOR TOTAL TEST

TEST FORM	CORRELATION
A	.68
B	.94
C	.79
D	.58
E	.56
F	.53

TABLE VIII

Correlations Between Gross Scores for Each Test Form with Gross Scores on Remaining Forms

Test Form	Correlation
A	.11
B	.42
C	.30
D	.36
E	.36
F	.21

TABLE IX

Correlations Between Diagnosis Given by Each Form of Test with Diagnosis Given by Total Test

Test Form	119 Cases ρ Method	40 Cases r	Approximate Composite
A	.54	.63	.58
B	.60	.86	.73
C	.53	.67	.60
D	.58	.56	.57
E	.61	.49	.55
F	.48	.42	.45

TABLE X

Ballot for Most Fair-Minded Person

Faculty No. 1 (About 100 Persons)

Number of Persons	Votes Received
1	11
1	7
1	6
2	4
3	3
5	2
21	1
Total 34	72 (Cast by 39 voters)

TABLE X (*Continued*)

BALLOT FOR MOST FAIR-MINDED PERSON

Faculty Vote on Faculty No. 2 (About 22 Persons)

NUMBER OF PERSONS	VOTES RECEIVED
2	7
1	6
1	3
3	2
7	1
TOTAL 14	36 (Cast by 18 voters)

Students Vote on Faculty No. 2 (About 22 Persons)*

NUMBER OF PERSONS	VOTES RECEIVED
1	33
1	12
1	7
1	6
1	5
1	3
5	2
6	1
TOTAL 17	82 (Cast by 44 voters)

Student Vote on Student Body No. 1 (About 120 Persons)

NUMBER OF PERSONS	VOTES RECEIVED
1	11
1	7
1	6
1	5
3	3
9	2
21	1
TOTAL 37	77 (Cast by 42 voters)

*Note: The first four selected by this vote included the same persons as were among the first four selected by the faculty vote. There was one difference in order.

TABLE XI

AGREEMENT BETWEEN PREDICTIONS MADE BY OTHER PERSONS, AND PREJUDICES REVEALED IN TEST PROFILES

PROFILES NUMBERS 1–24

Profile Number	Number of Predictions	Predictions Clearly Fulfilled	Predictions Doubtful	Predictions Not Fulfilled
1	3	3		
2	2	2		
3	4	3		1
4	4	4		
5	2	1		1
6	1	1		
7	2		2	
8	2	2		
9	1	1		
10	2	2		
11	3	2	1	
12	3			3
13	3	3		
14	3	2	1	
15	1	1		
16	2		1	1
17	3	3		
18	2	1	1	
19	4	2	2	
20	1	1		
21	4	4		
22	2	1	1	
23	3	3		
24	2	1	1	
TOTALS	59	43	10	6

TABLE XII

REACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL TEST SUBJECTS TO THEIR PREJUDICE PROFILES AS REVEALED BY THE TEST*

Profile Number	Number of Reactions	Number Approved	Questioned Number or Rejected
25.	9	9	
26.	2	2	
27.	9	9	
28.	9	7	2
29.	9	8	1
30.	9	9	
31.	9		9
32.	9	5	4
33.	9	8	1
34.	9	9	
35.	9	9	
36.	9	8	1
37.	9	9	
38.	9	8	1
39.	9	6	3
40.	9	8	1
41.	9	7	2
42.	9	7	2
43.	9	9	
44.	9	8	1
45.	9	9	
46.	9	7	2
47.	9	7	2
48.	9	4	5
49.	9	6	3
50.	9	9	
51.	9	6	3
52.	9	7	2
53.	9	5	4
54.	9	6	3
55.	9	9	
TOTALS	272	220	52

*Note: A "blanket" approval or disapproval, is interpreted here as equivalent to approval or disapproval of nine of the eighteen items.

TABLE XIII

AGREEMENT ON GROUP DIFFERENCES AS REVEALED BY TESTS WITH GROUP DIFFERENCES PREDICTED BY JUDGES

GROUPS COMPARED	NUMBER MARKED DIFFERENCES PREDICTED BY JUDGES	NUMBER THESE "MARKED" DIFFERENCES SHOWN BY TEST	NUMBER DIFFERENCES EXISTING BUT NOT "MARKED"
Catholic— Protestant	5	4	0
Normal School Students— Methodist Ministers	5	5	0
Ministers Over 40 Years of Age— Ministers Under 40 Years of Age	7	5	1
Methodist Ministers— Students, Union Theological Seminary	6	5	1
Ministers, Theological Seminary— Ministers with only High School Preparation	4	3	0
New Jersey Students— Wisconsin Students	2	2	0
Yale Divinity Students— Students Union Theological Seminary	3	2	1
TOTALS	32	26	3

TABLE XIV

AGREEMENT OF JUDGES WITH OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS AS REVEALED BY TESTS

GROUPS COMPARED	NUMBER JUDGES DIFFERENCES AS SHOWN	NUMBER JUDGES EXPECTING DIFFERENCES IN REVERSE DIRECTION
Catholic— Protestant	42	3
Normal School Students— Methodist Ministers	37	1
Ministers Over 40 Years of Age— Ministers Under 40 Years of Age	31	8
Methodist Ministers— Students: Union Theological Seminary	34	0
Ministers: Theological Seminary— Ministers with only High School Preparation	29	1
New Jersey Students— Wisconsin Students	25	6
Yale Divinity Students— Union Theological Seminary Students	23	3
TOTALS	221	22

TABLE XV

SUMMARY OF PREJUDICE SCORES AT BEGINNING AND END OF CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN COUNTRY LIFE ASSOCIATION

BASIS OF SCORE	AVERAGE PER CENT PREJUDICE BEGINNING	AVERAGE PER CENT PREJUDICE END
Complete Test: Gross Score	34%	34%
Form A (Cross Out Test)	25	24
Form B (Degree of Truth Test)	42	44
Form E (Arguments Test)	13	17
Analyzed Score in Agreement with:		
1. Orthodox, Fundamentalist Religion	8	7
2. Radical Religious Ideas	13	12
3. Economic Capitalism, Conservatism	7	8
4. Radical and Liberal Economic Ideas	17	16
5. Backward, Conservative, Agricultural and Community Outlook	5	5
6. Liberal, Progressive Agricultural and Community Outlook	12	12

The differences between conservative points of view which range from 5 per cent to 8 per cent, and progressive, liberal points of view which range from 12 per cent to 17 per cent are probably significant as indicating the "tone" of the conference. None of the changes between beginning and end are large enough to have any clear significance.



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